After Woerner, Courts Look for "Good Gambles"

You've got to know when to hold 'em
Know when to fold 'em
Know when to walk away
And know when to run
--Kenny Rogers, The Gambler

After the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Barron & Newburger, P.C. v. Texas Skyline Ltd. (Matter of Woerner), 783 F.3d 286 (5^th Cir. 2015), lawyers for bankruptcy estates breathed a sigh of relief, knowing that they could still be compensated for “good gambles” gone awry.   However, how would the courts measure a “good gamble” in the context of a case that didn’t quite work out?   Two decisions issued on the same day help answer that question.    In Case No. 13-33264, Digerati Technologies, Inc. (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 8/21/15), a highly contentious case resulted in a confirmed plan but only after an initial plan proposed by management was rejected.   In Case No. 10-11365, In re Woerner(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 8/21/15), the Bankruptcy Court that ruled in the case that was eventually reversed by the en banc Fifth Circuit reconsidered its ruling following remand.   In both cases, debtor’s counsel received some but not all of the fees requested.

Recovering Attorneys' Fees in Dischargeability Litigation

A new opinion from Judge Tony Davis answers some interesting questions about recovery of attorneys' fees in dischargeability litigation.   Schwertner Backhoe Services, Inc. v. Kirk (In re Kirk), Adv. No. 11-1239 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1/28/15), which can be found here.    The Court concluded that a prevailing plaintiff could recover attorneys' fees allowable under state law but could not recover for litigating pure issues of dischargeability.   

The case involved a dischargeability complaint brought under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 523(a)(4) based on the Texas Construction Trust Fund Act.   The Debtor owned a homebuilding company which did not pay one of its subcontractors.   The Debtor's answer was ambiguous as to whether the creditor's underlying debt was owed.   However, when the Debtor's deposition was taken, about two years into the litigation, the Debtor acknowledged that the debt was owed.   Prior to trial, the Debtor stipulated that the underlying debt was non-dischargeable but disputed that the creditor could recover attorneys' fees.

The Court reached several conclusions.   First, it concluded that if a debt includes pre-petition attorneys' fees and is determined to be non-dischargeable, the attorneys' fees are part of the non-dischargeable debt.   Second, the Court concluded that "(s)ince the Bankruptcy Code does not address whether creditors can recover attorney’s fees in nondischargeability cases, they can only do so if allowed by another statute or by contract."    Opinion, p. 6.    

The Court clarified that the recovery of attorneys' fees depended on the specific language of the contract or statute.   In discussing prior Texas bankruptcy cases, the Court noted that where a contractual debt was determined to be non-dischargeable based on fraud, the attorneys' fees were not included in the non-dischargeable debt.   On the other hand, where the contract allowed recovery of fees for "all costs of collection and enforcement," the cost of prosecuting the non-dischargeability action "contributed directly" to the effort to collect and enforce the notes.  

In the specific case, the Court concluded that the Texas Construction Trust Fund Act did not allow for recovery of attorney's fees.   In doing so, the Court was required to choose between competing lines of state court precedent.    However, it did find that under the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code, fees could be imposed for fees incurred in establishing the liability for labor and materials provided.    As a result, the Court concluded that the creditor could recover reasonable attorneys' fees for amounts incurred prior to the Debtor's admission that his company was liable for the underlying debt but not afterwards.  

The Court explained:

(F)ees cannot be awarded for litigating defalcation in this case because doing so is essentially the same as establishing Kirk’s liability under the Texas Construction Trust Fund Act; both determinations are predicated on the same facts – that Kirk was a fiduciary, and that he failed to handle funds properly. Put another way, this aspect of what Schwertner Backhoe had to prove is an action for which the Texas legislature has not shifted fees. Cohen renders properly awarded fees nondischargeable; it does not provide an independent basis for awarding fees.

Opinion, p. 14.    As a result, the Court awarded the creditor approximately half of the attorneys' fees that it requested.

The practice point here is that the Debtor should be cautious about disputing liability on the underlying claim asserted in the dischargeability action.    If the Debtor had admitted liability for the underlying debt from the beginning, the creditor could not have recovered its attorneys' fees.

Note:  This is a case which I took over from another attorney.   However, I can't sure that I would have caught the importance of admitting liability on the underlying debt if I had represented the Debtor from the outset.   

Lessons on Fees from the Fifth Circuit's ASARCO Decision

While the Fifth Circuit has yet to definitively address the quirky Pro-Snax opinion, a new decision provides some helpful guidance on recovering attorneys' fees in bankruptcy.    ASARCO, LLC v. Jordan Hyden Womble Culbreth & Holzer, P.C. (Matter of ASARCO, LLC), No. 12-40997 (5th Cir. 4/30/14).    You can read the opinion here

What Happened

ASARCO was a copper mining, smelting and refining company.  It used to have a really big smokestack in my home town of El Paso, but that's another story. Two years before bankruptcy, ASARCO's parent, Americas Mining Corporation (AMC), directed ASARCO to transfer a controlling interest in Southern Copper Corporation to it.   After ASARCO filed chapter 11 in 2005, its attorneys, Baker Botts and Jordan Hyden Womble Culbreth & Holzer, filed a fraudulent transfer action against the parent company.    The attorneys did a really good job.   They recovered a judgment valued at between $7-$10 billion which, according to the Fifth Circuit "was the largest fraudulent transfer judgment in Chapter 11 history."    When ASARCO sought to monetize its judgment, AMC decided that it would be cheaper to fund the company's reorganization instead.   As a result, ASARCO emerged from bankruptcy after just  52 months with "little debt, $1.4 billion in cash, and the successful resolution of its environmental, asbestos and toxic tort claims."    

You would think that everyone would be very happy with the work done by the attorneys.    The two firms applied for their lodestar fees plus a 20% enhancement as well as their expenses for preparing and litigating their fee applications.    ASARCO, which was now under the control of its parent, challenged the fees.   One discovery request sent to Baker Botts requested every document that the firm had produced during the bankruptcy case.   This resulted in production of 2,350 boxes of documents plus 189 GB of electronic data.   

After a six day trial, the Bankruptcy Court awarded Baker Botts $113 million in fees plus an enhancement of $4.1 million for the work performed on the fraudulent conveyance case.   Jordan Hyden recovered $7 million in fees as well as an enhancement of $125,000.   The Court also awarded fees for defending the fee applications, which amounted to $5 million for Baker Botts and $15,000 for Jordan Hyden.  

The District Court affirmed.

The Fifth Circuit's Ruling

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the enhancements but denied the fees for defending the fee applications.   Its analysis recapped the three-pronged approach adopted by the Court in In re Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 690 F.3d 650 (5th Cir. 2012) in which the Court held that fees should be determined under a combination of the lodestar approach, the factors specified in 11 U.S.C. Sec. 330(a) and the twelve factors from Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).    The Court explained that

Section 330(a), the lodestar method, and the Johnson factors work in conjunction with each other to guide the court's discretion.

Opinion. p. 6.   The Court further explained that the lodestar calculation (reasonable rates multiplied by a reasonable number of hours) provides the starting point for the analysis and that the lodestar amount can be adjusted up or down based upon the other factors.    The fact that the lodestar can be adjusted up provides the analytical basis for fee enhancements in "rare and extraordinary cases."   

The Court rejected challenges from ASARCO that fee enhancements could never be allowed, that enhancements had to be approved by the client and that enhancements could only be allowed where there was a "plus factor" in addition to extraordinary results.  

The Court also considered whether Baker Botts's fees were "below market" as found by the Bankruptcy Court.   The firm's blended rate was $353.98 per hour with partners charging $365-$800 per hour and associates billing $$195-$525 per hour.   The Court ruled that because "reasonable attorneys' fees in federal court have (not) been 'nationalized,'" it was improper to look at fees charged in other circuits.   Opinion, p. 10.   Nevertheless, the Court found that the Bankruptcy Court's finding was supported by enough evidence to survive clear error review.   Indeed, the rates charged by Baker Botts were less on a blended rate basis than any of the other firms in the case.   See In re ASARCO, LLC, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 5487 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011).

However, the Court was not persuaded by the award of fees for defending the fee application.   The Court stated:

We conclude that, correctly read, Section 330(a) does not authorize compensation for the costs counsel or professionals bear to defend their fee applications.

Opinion, p. 13.   The Court based this ruling on the language of section 330(a), which expressly allows fees for preparing a fee application but not for defending one.  

Parties in interest as well as the United States Trustee are entitled to receive notice and the opportunity for a hearing to question bankruptcy professional fees. Section 330(a)(1). Implicit in this procedure is the possibility of fee litigation. Nevertheless, Section 330 states twice, in both positive and negative terms paraphrased above, that professional services are compensable only if they are likely to benefit a debtor’s estate or are necessary to case administration. Matter of Pro-Snax Distributors, Inc., 157 F.3d 414, 418 n.7 (5th Cir. 1998). The primary beneficiary of a professional fee application, of course, is the professional. While the debtor’s estate or its administration must have benefitted from the services rendered, the debtor’s estate, and therefore normally the creditors, bear the cost. This straightforward reading strongly suggests that fees for defense of a fee application are not compensable from the debtor’s estate. The Eleventh Circuit adopted this interpretation in a factually similar case, holding that “. . . the issue is whether the services rendered were reasonable and necessary to the administration of the estate. [internal citation omitted] The answer to this question is no. The subject of the [appeal and cross-appeal] was the fee to be paid to [the professional] for his services rendered in the administration of the estate. The appeals brought absolutely no benefit to the estate, the creditors, or the debtor.”(citation omitted).  

Further supporting this interpretation is Section 330(a)(6), which limits potential professional fees in two ways. First, the specification of an award for “preparation of a fee application” is clearly different from authorizing fees for the defense of the application in a court hearing. Second, tailoring the award to the “level and skill reasonably required to prepare the application” emphasizes scrivener’s skills over other professional work. It is untenable to construe this language alone to encompass satellite litigation over a fee application. Had Congress intended compensation for professional fee applications to be allowable as “reasonable and necessary” under Section 330(a)(3)(C), there would have been no need to create the limits specified in subdivision (4). The broad reading of Section 330(a)(3)(C) urged by Baker Botts would render Section 330(a)(4) superfluous.

Opinion, pp. 13-14.   The Court then explained how the American rule weighed against fees for defense.

Because Congress designed fee shifting provisions in express derogation of the American Rule that each party to litigation bears its own costs, the losing party should bear the full costs of counsel for the winner. In bankruptcy, the equities are quite different. Both the debtor and creditors have enforceable rights, and there is a limited pool of assets to satisfy those rights and compensate court-approved professionals; in certain cases, moreover, professionals paid from the debtor’s estate represent competing interests. No side wears the black hat for administrative fee purposes. In the absence of explicit statutory guidance, requiring professionals to defend their fee applications as a cost of doing business is consistent with the reality of the bankruptcy process. The perverse incentives that could arise from paying the bankruptcy professionals to engage in satellite fee litigation are easy to conceive.  (emphasis added).

Opinion, p. 16.

The Court dismissed the argument that denying fees for defense of a fee application would encourage excessive fee litigation with the comment that

Too frequently, court-appointed counsel for debtor[’s] and the official creditor committees’ interests in a case, sharing the mutual goal of securing approval for their fees, enter into a conspiracy of silence with regard to contesting each other’s fee applications. (citation omitted).

Opinion, p. 18.  Nevertheless, the Court allowed that fees for defense could be allowed where "an adverse party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons."   Opinion, p. 19.

Thus, the final result was that Baker Botts was able to retain its enhancement of $4.1 million but lost its fees for defense of $5 million.   Jordan Hyden fared slightly better, retaining its enhancement of $125,000 while having $15,000 in cost of defense fees cut.   The Court tried to place this loss in context, stating:

In this case, the huge cost of defending Baker Botts's core fees seems a drastic reduction in absolute terms, but it amounts to only about 4.4% of the core fee.

Opinion, p. 17.   Thus, the message to Baker Botts from the appellate court was you did an amazing job, but you still have to pay the cost of proving that you did an amazing job.

Take-Aways from the Opinion

While this opinion addresses two very discrete issues, the extensive discussion contains some important lessons about attorneys' fees in bankruptcy.

1. The accolades heaped upon Baker Botts are a measure of respect for the bankruptcy profession.   Even though Baker Botts plays in a more rarified world than the average bankruptcy practitioner, recognition for one bankruptcy professional is approval for the profession as a whole, just as incompetent, dishonest or mercenary behavior by bankruptcy lawyers tends to diminish it.    
2. The Fifth Circuit has re-affirmed the unique amalgamation of three tests first announced in Pilgrim's Pride.   Professionals litigating attorneys' fees in the Fifth Circuit cannot simply rely on the language of the statute, but should consider whether the other two tests enhance or detract from their position.
3. The Court's comments about national vs. regional fees reflect a compromise position between the efficiency of administration standard under the Bankruptcy Act and the "greed is good" mantra of Gordon Gecko.    While bankruptcy is no longer the poor stepsister of the legal practice, professionals cannot charge amounts exceeding the local prevailing rate simply because that is what they charge in some other, more expensive jurisdiction.
4. The Fifth Circuit mentioned Pro-Snax, but not for its most infamous holding.   While the lower courts have struggled to implement the "tangible, identifiable and material benefit" standard, the Fifth Circuit has not revisited this language since its 1998 debut.   In this opinion, the Court mentioned one of Pro-Snax's less controversial statements that fees must be likely to benefit the estate or necessary to administration in order to be compensable.  This may be a signal from the Circuit that it will focus on the parts of the opinion that are uncontroversial while de-emphasizing the questionable language.     
5. The Court recognized that challenging another professional's fees, while distasteful, is an important part of the process.   The Court's warning against the "conspiracy of silence" as well as its no black hats in fee litigation suggest that professional fees should be exposed to the same adversary process as other facts required to be determined by the courts.   While it may be easier to let the U.S. Trustee or the bankruptcy court do the heavy lifting, the parties will often have the most knowledge and incentive to develop the record.

Pilgrim's Pride Opinion Allows Enhancements in Bankruptcy, Offers Comprehensive Overview of Bankruptcy Fees

The Fifth Circuit has affirmed a $1 million fee enhancement to a chief restructuring officer who achieved results described as “rare and exceptional.”  Matter of Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., No. 11-10774 (5^th Cir. 8/10/12).   The opinion can be found here.   The Court rejected the argument that a recent Supreme Court opinion on fee shifting precluded enhancements and, in the process, set forth a comprehensive framework for allowance of professional fees in bankruptcy.   Curiously, the opinion did not mention the Court’s opinion in Matter of Pro-Snax Distributors, Inc., 157 F.3d 414 (5^th Cir. 1998).

What Happened

When Pilgrim’s Pride Company filed for chapter 11 relief in December 2008, its prospects did not look good.   It had lost about $1 billion the previous fiscal year and was incurring negative cash flow of $300 million a year.   The Debtors anticipated that unsecured creditors would receive, at best, a debt for equity swap, and that equity would be cancelled. 

  

CRG Partners, LLC was engaged as chief restructuring officer.    Just over a year later, the company confirmed a plan which paid all secured and unsecured creditors in full and distributed equity interests valued at $450 million to the pre-petition shareholders.   

After the plan was confirmed, CRG requested that it be allowed compensation of $5.98 million plus an enhancement of $1 million.    The Debtor’s Board of Directors supported the enhancement.   The U.S. Trustee objected to the enhancement on the basis that CRG had already been adequately compensated through its lodestar-calculated fee.   The Bankruptcy Court denied the request for enhancement based on Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S.Ct. 1662 (2010).   The District Court reversed, finding that Perdue was not binding in the bankruptcy context.

On remand, the Bankruptcy Court approved the enhancement and the U.S. Trustee appealed.    The UST argued that Perdue precluded the enhancement.   The Fifth Circuit rejected the Trustee’s position and affirmed the Bankruptcy Court order approving the additional award.

An Overview of Professional Fees

In reaching its conclusion that enhancements remained viable, the Court of Appeals provided an extensive discussion of the history of awards of professional fees in the Fifth Circuit.   Under the Bankruptcy Act, courts in the Fifth Circuit applied the twelve Johnson factors, which included such requirements as the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions, skill required, undesirability of the case and reputation of the attorneys.    In re First Colonial Corp. of America, 544 F.2d 1291, 1298-99 (5^th Cir. 1977), quoting Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5^th Cir. 1974).   (Attorneys of a certain level of experience will remember preparing fee applications reciting the twelve Johnson/First Colonial factors even though many of them were usually irrelevant to the specific case).   While Johnson was a civil rights case, the First Colonial court found the factors to be “equally useful whenever the award of reasonable attorneys’ fees is authorized by statute.”     Id. at 1299.   While the same factors might be applicable, bankruptcy courts were advised to make awards at the lower end of the spectrum in light of the “strong policy of the Bankruptcy Act that estates be administered as efficiently as possible.”    Id.

The lodestar method was recommended by another Act case, In re Lawler, 807 F.2d 1207 (5^th Cir. 1987).    Under the lodestar method, the Court determines a reasonable number of hours multiplied by a reasonable rate and then adjusts the resulting fee up or down based upon the other Johnson factors.

When section 330(a) was adopted as part of the Bankruptcy Code, it retained the overall framework of compensation under the Act, but rejected the “economy of the estate” limitation.   This meant that bankruptcy lawyers could be compensated at the same rate as other skilled professionals.   

Section 330(a) was amended in 1994 to include a list of six non-exclusive factors to be considered in awarding compensation and two instances in which the court should deny compensation.    Notwithstanding the statutory definition, the Fifth Circuit found that the prior case law and the statutory provisions provided a complimentary framework.

Following the Bankruptcy Code’s enactment, we made clear that the lodestar, Johnson factors, and §330 coalesced to form the framework that regulates the compensation of professionals employed by the bankruptcy estate.   (citation omitted).   Under this framework, bankruptcy courts must first calculate the amount of the lodestar.   (citation omitted).    After doing so, the courts “then may adjust the lodestar up or down based on the factors contained in §330 and [their] consideration of the factors listed in Johnson.”   (citation omitted).    We have also emphasized that bankruptcy courts have “considerable discretion” when determining whether an upward or downward adjustment of the lodestar is warranted.

Opinion, at p. 8.   

The Court also conducted an historical analysis of fee enhancements in bankruptcy, finding that, although they were extraordinary, they had been allowed under both the Bankruptcy Act and the Code.    The Court noted that 

(I)f enhancements were possible when fees were awarded “at the lower end of the spectrum of reasonableness,” then they surely remained possible after that ceiling was removed and the statutory text was otherwise unchanged.

Opinion, at p. 13.    The Court’s point is that because the Bankruptcy Act allowed enhancements despite the focus on economy of administration that it would be reasonable for enhancements to be allowed under the more liberal provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

In conclusion, the Court ruled that enhancements were a part of the process of upward or downward adjustment of the lodestar and remained available in extraordinary situations.

In sum, we have consistently held that bankruptcy courts have broad discretion to adjust the lodestar upwards or downwards when awarding reasonable compensation to professionals employed by the estate pursuant to § 330(a). However, this discretion is far from limitless. Upward adjustments, for instance, are still only permissible in rare and exceptional circumstances--such as in Rose Pass Mines and Lawler, where the applicants had provided superior services that produced outstanding results--that are supported by detailed findings from the bankruptcy court and specific evidence in the record.

Opinion, at 15.

Sub Silentio and the Rule of Orderliness 

Having concluded that enhancements remained viable, the Court turned its attention to whether the Supreme Court had “unequivocally, sub silentio overruled our circuit’s bankruptcy precedent.”   Opinion, p. 15.  

 

In Perdue, the Supreme Court rejected a request for an enhancement in a civil rights case.   In interpreting the term “reasonable fees” under 42 U.S.C. §1988, the Supreme Court noted that the courts had initially applied the twelve Johnson factors, but had transitioned to a lodestar approach in order to “cabin() the discretion of trial judges.”    The Supreme Court concluded that enhancements could be allowed under section 1988, but only where the hourly rate used in the lodestar calculation did not adequately measure the attorney’s true market value, where the litigation involved an “extraordinary” outlay of expenses and where there was an “exceptional delay” in payment, especially where that delay was due to the defense.    The Court also noted that in civil rights cases, the presumption should be against an enhancement because defendants would be less likely to settle if faced with an open-ended fee request and because civil rights judgments were often paid by the public rather than the defendant. 

  

The Fifth Circuit found that Perdue did not apply in the bankruptcy context.   Relying on the rule of orderliness, as recently articulated in Technical Automation Services Corp. v. Liberty Surplus Insurance Corp., 673 F.3d 399 (5^th Cir. 2012)(which held that Stern v. Marshall did not implicate the authority of Magistrate Judges), the Fifth Circuit found that Perdue was not directly on point and therefore did not compel the Court to abandon its prior precedent.   Among other things, the Court found that bankruptcy fee requests did not entail the same settlement considerations as civil rights cases and that the bankruptcy estate rather than the taxpayer would be paying the fees. 

 

The Court also noted that while the term “reasonable fees” in section 1988 offered little guidance to courts, that section 330(a) of the Bankruptcy Code contained detailed criteria for awarding fees.   

As a result, the Court concluded that until rescinded by a higher authority, fee enhancements were still possible in bankruptcy.   As a result, the Court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s enhanced fee award to CRG Partners.

What It Means

In the particular case, Pilgrim’s Pride means that a particular professional was recognized for doing an extraordinary job.    In the larger context, Pilgrim’s Pride is significant for what its historical analysis said for what it left unsaid.    

From an historical perspective, Pilgrim’s Pride evidences the development of bankruptcy law as its own discipline.    As of 1977, both bankruptcy law and civil rights law followed the twelve Johnson factors.   In the intervening 35 years, bankruptcy has developed its own body of fee jurisprudence.    While both bankruptcy law and civil rights law moved from the Johnson factors to a primarily lodestar based approach, Congress saw fit to define bankruptcy standards in more detail.     The Pilgrim’s Pride decision recognizes that bankruptcy fees fulfill a different role than fees in civil rights cases.    While the Court did not fully articulate it, I believe the difference is this.   Bankruptcy is inherently a collective process in which scarce resources are marshaled for the benefit of the creditor body and (in some cases) equity.    Allowing enhanced fees in rare cases provides incentives for professionals to take on difficult cases and be recognized when they deliver superior results.   Civil rights cases, on the other hand, are focused on compensating a harm and are a zero sum proposition.   Every dollar paid to the plaintiffs and their attorneys is a dollar taken away from the defendants and, by extension, the taxpayers.    While civil rights actions should incentivize government actors to obey the law in future cases, this function is secondary to compensating the wronged individual.    In a bankruptcy case, the professional may not only allocate scarce resources according to an ordered scheme of priorities, but may actually increase the pool of resources.   In a civil rights case, it seems that counsel is focused on obtaining an equitable transfer of resources from one party to another.    

Pilgrim’s Pride also curious because it does not mention the requirement that a professional demonstrate an “identifiable, tangible and material benefit to the bankruptcy estate” as required by In re Pro-Snax Distributors, Inc. in order to be compensated.   There is a tension between Pro-Snax and section 330(a)(4)(A)(i)(I) which mandates denial of fees for services not “reasonably likely to benefit the debtor’s estate.”   There is a significant difference in requiring that services be “reasonably likely” to benefit the estate as opposed to actually yielding an “identifiable, tangible and material benefit.”    In the one instance, compensation is based on whether the services appeared to be reasonable at the time, while the other makes compensation contingent on results.    Pilgrim’s Pride discusses the Johnson factors, the lodestar test and the statutory provisions of section 330(a), but does not discuss Pro-Snax.  Judge Carl Stewart, who authored Pro-Snax, was on the panel that decided Pilgrim’s Pride.

It is certainly possible that the panel did not see the need to discuss Pro-Snax for the reason that Pilgrim’s Pride was a case involving not just an “identifiable, tangible and material benefit,” but an extraordinary one at that.    However, given the Court’s comprehensive discussion of the framework for fees in bankruptcy and its contrast with fees in civil rights cases, the actual results requirement would seem to be a reasonable thing to mention.   

My personal opinion (which is partially motivated by self-interest) is that the Pro-Snax panel never intended to impose an actual results requirement.    The Pilgrim’s Pride opinion discusses how “the lodestar, Johnson factors, and §330 coalesced to form the framework that regulates the compensation of professionals employed by the bankruptcy estate.”    Under Johnson, results were one of twelve factors to be considered.   Under section 330(a), the court is instructed to examine whether the services were “beneficial at the time” and whether they were “reasonably likely to benefit the debtor’s estate.”   The lodestar may be adjusted upwards or downwards based upon the results.    Given that results are a factor to be considered under each of these approaches, it is much more reasonable to conclude that the Pro-Snax panel meant to emphasize the importance of results but not to make them an absolute requirement.   At the very least, it will make for an interesting argument when the Court is asked directly to reconcile Pilgrim’s Pride, Pro-Snax and the language of section 330(a).

Disclosure:   I have a case pending on appeal that raises the application of Pro-Snax.

Civil Rights Opinion May Affect Attorney's Fees in Bankruptcy

A decision reviewing attorney's fees in a complex Title VII class action may have repercussions for attorney's fees in bankruptcy cases as well. McClain v. Lufkin Industries, Inc., No. 10-40036 (5th Cir. 8/8/11). You can find the opinion here.

What Happened

The Lufkin Industries case appears to be a David v. Goliath case where David decided he needed reinforcements. Timothy Garrigan, an attorney with a three attorney firm in Nacogdoches, Texas filed a class action suit against Lufkin Industries, Inc. under Title VII, alleging disparate treatment and disparate impact theories. While Mr. Garrigan was found to be well-qualified to handle the class-action, he determined that "it was imperative to associate with co-counsel in order to successfully try this case." The Court wryly noted that, "The case's ultimate trajectory, which spanned a decade and involved thousands of attorney hours, confirmed his initial impression."

When Mr. Garrigan went searching for co-counsel, he had to cast a wide net. After being turned down by multiple Texas firms, he ultimately associated Goldstein, Demchak, a firm from Oakland, California. The plaintiffs' team was successful. Although their initial judgment was reversed and paired down, the plaintiff class still recovered $3.3 million in back pay for discriminatorily lost promotions dating back to 1994.

The plaintiff's attorneys sought $7.7 million in fees. The Court allowed $4.7 million in fees. In doing so, they calculated the lodestar for both the Texas and the California lawyers at $400.00 per hour. This displeased the California lawyers who had sought an award based on $650.00 per hour. Specifically, the District Court ruled that fees should be awarded based on the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal market.

The Ruling

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit considered how to calculate the lodestar, that is, the proper hourly rate to be multiplied by the proper number of hours. The Court stated:

The precedents and purposes governing fee-shifting awards in civil rights cases are well established. The awards facilitate plaintiffs’ access to the courts to vindicate their rights by providing compensation sufficient to attract competent counsel. Fee awards must, however, be reasonable. (citation omitted). The linchpin of the reasonable fee is the lodestar calculation, a product of the hours reasonably expended by the law firms and the reasonable hourly rate for their services. (citation omitted). Charges for excessive, duplicative, or inadequately documented work must be excluded. (citation omitted).

Seminal to this case is the principle that “reasonable” hourly rates “are to be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” (citation omitted). Further, Blum noted, “the burden is on the applicant to produce satisfactory evidence . . . that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” (citation omitted). In an unbroken and consistent line of precedent, this court has interpreted rates “prevailing in the community” to mean what it says. Thus, as early as 1974, this court required district courts to consider the customary fee for similar work “in the community.” (citations omitted). Most telling, perhaps, is this court’s decision in a landmark affirmative action case reducing the fee of plaintiffs’ counsel, a former U.S. Assistant Attorney General and subsequent U.S. Solicitor General, from the rates he charged in Washington, D.C., to the prevailing rate in the forum, Austin, Texas. (citation omitted).

Opinion, pp. 8-9.

In the particular case, the Court found that

(W)here, as here, abundant and uncontradicted evidence proved the necessity of Garrigan's turning to out-of-district counsel, the co-counsel's '"home'' rates should be considered as a starting point for calculating the lodestar amount.

Opinion, p. 11.

What It Means

This conclusion is significant for the opposite of what it says. Out of district rates were allowed as the starting point for the lodestar because there was extensive evidence that no Texas lawyer was willing to touch the case. The converse is that an out-of-district lawyer cannot charge out-of-district rates if there was a qualified, local lawyer who could have taken the case.

The application to bankruptcy cases (which follow the same lodestar approach) is that a New York lawyer cannot charge New York rates in Houston without showing that a similarly qualified Houston lawyer was not available, or that a Houston lawyer could not charge Houston rates in Austin without showing that a similarly qualified Austin lawyer was not available, or that an Austin lawyer could not charge Austin rates in Waco without showing that a similarly qualified Waco lawyer was not available.

If this decision is applied to bankruptcy cases, it could prove to be a boon to local lawyers who are perfectly qualified to handle difficult cases but are willing to charge local rates. After all, if Ted Olson was limited to Austin rates in Hopwood v. State of Texas, why would a bankruptcy court in Austin allow a Washington, D.C. firm to charge D.C. rates in a bankruptcy case in Austin, Texas?

The Concurrences

Almost as interesting as the majority opinion are the concurrences. Chief Judge Jones and Circuit Judge Dennis each wrote separately to discuss aspects of the case. Since Chief Judge Jones authored the majority opinion, her concurrence to her own opinion is interesting to say the least.

Chief Judge Jones wrote to express her concern that the California lawyers were, let's be frank here, being greedy. She stated:

It cannot escape the reader’s attention that the Goldstein Demchak firm has been authorized to receive several million dollars in fees, and a million dollars in expenses, for prevailing in this protracted case. But to them, that’s not enough, and they seek an hourly increase that will add $3 million more to their award. If that happens, the attorneys will have received nearly double the dollar award of the plaintiffs. What has fee shifting come to? This is not an appeal about incentivizing modestly compensated attorneys for pursuing noble goals: the $400 hourly rate awarded to Mr. Garrigan is hardly a day laborer’s fee. This appeal is designed simply to enrich, not to enhance or encourage. The Supreme Court holds that fee-shifting cannot bring a windfall to attorneys. (citation omitted). On remand, the district court should exercise its discretion within the parameters we have set out to prevent a windfall recovery.

Opinion, at pp. 20-21. Do you think that Judge Jones made her feelings about the fees in this case clear enough? While Chief Judge Jones' majority opinion allowed the possibility of higher rates for out of district counsel, her concurrence suggests that she strongly objects to allowing that possibility in practice. Query whether she would show the same scorn for a bank's lawyers who sought to obtain a "windfall recovery"?

Judge Dennis wrote separately to suggest that the "hourly rates charged by the defendant's attorney's provide a helpful guide in determining whether similarly high rates and hours requested by the plaintiffs were reasonable." In the bankruptcy context, if the creditor's lawyers are charging obscene fees, then the debtor's lawyers may charge merely scandalous fees.

I think that this opinion, while affirming national rates in the specific case, is a victory for local rates in general. Of course, it bears mentioning that determining the appropriate market rates to use in the lodestar is only the starting point. Courts are still free to adjust upward or downward based upon the facts of the specific case.

Supreme Court Allows Recovery of Post-Petition Attorney's Fees Based On Pre-Petition Contract

In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court ruled that nothing in the Bankruptcy Code prohibits a creditor from asserting an unsecured claim for attorney's fees incurred post-petition where such fees would have been recoverable outside of bankruptcy. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., No. 05-1429 (U.S. 3/20/07).

Travelers had issued a surety bond to Pacific Gas & Electric. In connection with the bond, the parties executed a series of indemnity agreements which allowed recovery of attorney's fees incurred in protecting Travelers rights. Travelers filed a claim to protect itself in the event that the debtor defaulted in the future. The debtor's plan preserved Travelers right to subrogation and indemnity in the event of a default, but Travelers disputed whether the language was sufficient. As part of a settlement, PG & E agreed that Travelers could assert an unsecured claim for its attorney's fees. However, when Travelers amended its claim to add the attorney's fees, the debtor objected. The Bankruptcy Court sustained the objection based upon a Ninth Circuit decision which held that attorney's fees were not recoverable for litigating issues unique to bankruptcy. In re Fobian, 951 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). Not surprisingly, the District Court and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

The Supreme Court reversed, finding that Sec. 502(b)(1) generally allows claims to the same extent that they would be allowable outside of bankruptcy. The only subsection of Sec. 502(b) which addresses recovery of attorney's fees is Sec. 502(b)(4), which limits claims by an attorney for the debtor to the reasonable value of such services. Thus, where the Code contained a specific limitation on attorney's fees, the Court would not imply a broader one.

The Supreme Court found that Fobian did not have any support in the language of the Bankruptcy Code. Travelers did not attempt to defend the Fobian rule. Instead, it argued that because Sec. 506(b) only allows attorney's fees to oversecured creditors, that unsecured creditors should not be entitled to recover them at all. The Supreme Court declined to address this argument on the basis that it had not been raised in the lower courts.

This ruling is important for what is decides and for what it does not decide. The first important point is that this case was determined with regard to unsecured claims under Sec. 502(b). Even though the litigation in this case took place post-petition, the creditor did not attempt to assert a post-petition administrative claim. The Supreme Court's broad reading of claims allowable under Sec. 502 would not apply to administrative claims under Sec. 503, which have a much narrower scope. Although it was not discussed in the Supreme Court's opinion, it appears that the parties recognized that litigation under a pre-petition contract created a pre-petition claim even though the litigation occurred during the bankruptcy. The Travelers opinion will create more opportunities for parties who could have recovered attorney's fees pre-petition to amend their unsecured claims to include post-petition attorney's fees. For example, if the debtor unsuccessfully objects to a proof of claim which had a contractual attorney's fees provision, the creditor could add the fees for defending the claim to its unsecured claim. In most cases, adding additional amounts to the unsecured pot will not have a major effect on the case. However, the potential for amending claims after the bar date could create administrative headaches in cases.

The opinion also creates potential tension between Sec. 502(b) and Sec. 506(b). Sec. 502(b)(2) disallows claims for unmatured interest, while Sec. 506(b) allows interest to oversecured claimants. Thus, these two sections are consistent. On the other hand, Sec. 502(b) is silent as to allowance of attorney's fees while Sec. 506(b) allows such fees only to oversecured creditors. Thus, there is a potential for claims for post-petition attorney's fees to be allowed under Sec. 502(b) and disallowed under Sec. 506(b). Because the Sec. 506(b) issue on attorney's fees was not addressed by the Supreme Court, lower courts will have to guess at how it would resolve this issue. However, it may be a safe bet to assume that with all nine justices silent, it might be reasonable to assume that the Supreme Court would find a way to reconcile the two statutes as opposed to overruling a recent precedent.