In a display of pre-election bipartisanship, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a fraudulent transfer judgment in favor of Stanford International Bank Receiver Ralph Janvey against five Democratic and Republican campaign committees totaling approximately $1.6 million. Janvey v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, Inc., No. 11-10704 (5th Cir. 10/23/12), which can be found here. While the opinion involved a receivership rather than a bankruptcy proceeding, the issues under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act have bankruptcy implications as well.
The District Court granted summary judgment to the Receiver on claims that the contributions were made with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors. The Receiver alleged, and the District Court agreed, that payments made as part of a Ponzi scheme are presumptively made with intent to hinder, delay or defraud. According to the Receiver, this shifted the burden to the committees to show a defense such as good faith or reasonably equivalent value. The Committees did not argue on appeal that the Stanford entities received reasonably equivalent value for their political contributions. Unfortunately this meant that the opinion did not contain what would have been an interesting discussion of what contributors receive for their donations. The Committees no doubt concluded that the political risks of arguing that fraudsters receive a reasonably equivalent benefit for their contributions was too dangerous to advance (even if it could have been factually supported).
Instead, the Fifth Circuit addressed three issues. First, the Court ruled that a Receiver, like a bankruptcy trustee, may pursue claims under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act on behalf of creditors. The Committee had argued that the Receiver was not himself a creditor and therefore lacked standing to pursue the claims.
Next, the Court concluded that the transfers were made within the applicable limitations period. Under Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Section 24.010(a)(1), a plaintiff must institute an action to recover transfers under the intent to defraud provision within one year after the later of when the transfers were made or when they "reasonably could have been discovered by the claimant." In this case, the Receiver was appointed on February 16, 2009 and filed suit on February 20, 2010. The Committees argued that because records of the contributions were available online and had been discussed in the media, that the Receiver should have known about them not later than February 18, 2009, which would have made the suit untimely. Because February 16 was President's Day, the Receiver was not able to gain access to the Stanford offices until February 17. While this would have given the Receiver two days to discover the fraud, the Fifth Circuit applied a more sympathetic standard. It stated:
Given the extent of the Stanford enterprises, the Receiver’s duties with regard to them, and the extent of the fraudulent transfers, it would not have been reasonable to expect him to immediately discover the fraud.
Opinion, p. 7. Furthermore, the Court noted that it was the Defendants' burden to prove the limitations defense which meant that they were required to prove when the Receiver should have discovered the fraud. Apparently, three days to discover a fraud, even one based on publicly available records, was reasonable.
Because 11 U.S.C. Sec. 546 gives a bankruptcy trustee two years to commence an avoidance action, the benefit of the one year discovery rule is not readily apparent. However, if a transfer took place more than one year prior to bankruptcy but was not readily discoverable during that time, a trustee could still file suit within two years after the order for relief. Assume that a transfer was made on January 1, 2010 and the Debtor filed bankruptcy on January 1, 2012. If creditors of the Debtor could not have discovered the transfer during the one year period prior to bankruptcy, then the trustee would have until January 1, 2014 to file suit. While the discovery rule does not extend the trustee's period of time to file suit after bankruptcy is filed, it would extend the reach-back period for avoiding a transfer made prior to bankruptcy.
Finally, the Fifth Circuit held that federal election law did not preempt TUFTA. The Federal Campaign Act of 1971 preempts "any provision of State law with respect to election to federal office." Unfortunately for the Committees, the Court held that generally applicable fraudulent transfer laws are not state laws "with respect to election to federal office." The Court also held that the federal election laws do not occupy the field of election law so thoroughly as to preempt the suit. The Court wrote that the federal election law did not apply to a contributor using an impermissible source of funds as opposed to the committee making an improper use of those funds. Further, the Court noted that the committees' argument would lead to the absurd result that funds "stolen by force or fraud" would be protected so long as the committees otherwise complied with election law.
Because firms likely to fail have been known to curry favor by making political contributions, this opinion may help trustees avoid preemption arguments in the future.