Friday, June 19, 2009

Supreme Court Grants Cert in Attorney Speech Case

The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United United States, 541 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2008), cert granted, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 4277 (6/8/09). The Milavetz case held that the provision in BAPCPA preventing attorneys from advising debtors to incur debt in contemplation of bankruptcy was an unconstitutional restriction on the right to free speech under the First Amendment. Although it is not in direct conflict, the Fifth Circuit took a somewhat different tack on this issue, finding that the statute was not facially overbroad and reserving the issue of whether it could be overbroad as applied in a specific case. Hersh v. United States, 553 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 2008). Thus, the Eighth Circuit said that the statute was unconstitutional on its face, while the Fifth Circuit held that a constitutional challenge would have to wait until there was an actual case where an attorney was punished for providing advice contrary to the statute.

Milavetz also had two other rulings, finding that attorneys were Debt Relief Agencies and finding that the mandatory disclosures (i.e., "We a Debt Relief Agency") was constitutional. Most courts have agreed with these conclusions.

Milavetz had one interesting sidenote. The Commercial Law League of America, a professional group, which represents the interests of creditors, filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs' position. Thus, this is a case where a creditor's trade group spoke up for the speech rights of debtor's lawyers.

The order granting certiorari did not limit itself, so that it appear that the Supreme Court will take up all three issues.

Thursday, June 18, 2009

Supreme Court Decides One Case and Hints At Result in Another

While many continuing legal education conferences consist of regurgitations of things you already know, every once in a while, you gain an insight which makes it all worthwhile. Today at the State Bar of Texas Bankruptcy Section Bench-Bar Conference, I was fortunate enough to hear Nashville Bankruptcy Judge Keith Lundin tie together today's decision in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. ___ (6/18/09) with the decision to grant cert in Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds,Inc., 545 F.3d 1113, as amended at 553 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2008), cert granted, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 4361 (U.S. 6/15/09). The common link between the two cases is whether bankruptcy court orders which could have been objected to are subject to collateral attack when they are not. In Travelers, the Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy court injunction contained in a confirmation order was not subject to collateral attack. Judge Lundin suggested that the Supreme Court might be signalling a similar result in Espinosa, a case involving a chapter 13 confirmation order.

20 Year Old Order Trumps in Travelers

The Travelers case arose out of the Johns-Manville bankruptcy case. In return for contributing $770 million to a trust created by the plan of reorganization, Mansville's insurers received the benefit of an injunction preventing suits against them. Over a decade later, plaintiffs started suing Travelers for withholding information about the dangers of asbestos or conspiring with Manville to conceal the dangers of asbestos. Many of these suits accused Travelers of acting wrongfully in its own capacity rather than as Mansville's insurer.

Travelers agreed to settle with some of the plaintiffs in return for an order from the Bankruptcy Court clarifying that the suits were barred by the original 1986 order. The Bankruptcy Court granted the clarifying order, finding that the direct suits against Travelers were encompassed by its original order.

On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed. It held that it was not enough to look to the terms of the prior order. Instead, it was necessary to deteermine whether the order was within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court. Concluding that the Bankruptcy Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin suits against a non-debtor insurance company based on the insuror's own misconduct, the Second Circuit reversed.

On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and reinstated the Bankruptcy Court's order. The Supreme Court stated:

If this were a direct review of the 1986 Orders, the Court of Appeals would indeed have been duty bound to consider whether the Bankruptcy Court had acted beyond its subject-matter jurisdiction. (citation omitted). But the 1986 Orders became final on direct review over two decades ago, and Travelers' response to the Circuit's jurisdictional ruling is correct: whether the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction and authority to enter the injunction in 1986 was not properly before the Court of Appeals in 2008 and is not properly before us.
Opinion of the Court, p. 10.

Travelers Ruling Hints At Espinosa Result

While this ruling is significant, it also suggests that direction that the Supreme Court might take in a case in which it granted certiorari earlier this week. In Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., a chapter 13 debtor included several provisions in its plan related to student loans:

1. It provided that the student loan claim would be paid in the amount of $13,250;

2. It provided that "The amounts claimed by the United Student Loan Aid Funds, Inc., et. al. for capitalized interest, penalties, and fees shall not be paid for the reasons that the same are penalties and not provided for in the loan agreement between the Debtor and the lender."

3. It provided that amounts not paid under the plan would be discharged.

The creditor also received a notice stating that if it did not agree with the treatment provided for its claim under the plan, that it was under an obligation to object.

United Student Aid Funds, Inc. filed a claim for a higher amount, but did not object to the plan. After the debtor completed its plan and received a discharge, United began intercepting the Debtor's tax refunds. Espinosa sought to hold United in contempt, while United sought a determination that the plan could not discharge its student loan debt. The Bankruptcy Court ruled that the plan controlled and that the student loan debt was discharged.

On appeal, United claimed that the plan could not discharge the debt because the Debtor did not file an adversary proceeding seeking a hardship discharge. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating:

(W)hen the creditor is served with notice of the proposed plan, it has a full and fair opportunity to insist on the special procedures available to student loan creditors by objecting to the plan on the ground that there has been no undue hardship finding. Rights may, of course, be waived or forfeited, if not raised in a timely fashion. This doesn't mean that these rights are ignored, or that a judgment that is entered after a party fails to assert them conflicts with the statutory scheme or is somehow invalid.
Espinosa, at 1118.

The Ninth Circuit rejected an argument that United did not receive due process.

It makes a mockery of the English language and common sense to say that Funds wasn't given notice, or was somehow ambushed or taken advantage of. The only thing the creditor was not told is that it could insist on an adversary proceeding and a judicial determination of undue hardship. But that's less a matter of notice and more of a tutorial as to what rights the creditor has under the Bankruptcy Code--a long-form Miranda warning for bankers. If that were the standard for adequate notice, every notification under the Bankruptcy Code would have to be accompanied by Collier's Treatise, lest the creditor overlook some rights it might have under the Code.
Esinosa, at 1121.

On motion for rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit found it necessary to add some additional authority to its opinion. One of its insertions referred to a treatise written by Judge Keith Lundin, stating:

Rather, we agree with Judge Lundin that "Pardee and Andersen stand soundly for the better-reasoned principle that notice of how the Chapter 13 plan affects creditors' rights is all that the Constitution, the Bankruptcy Code and the Bankruptcy Rules require to bind creditors to the provisions of a confirmed plan under § 1327(a)." Keith M. Lundin, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy § 229.1 (3d ed. 2000 & Supp. 2004)."
553 F.3d at 1196.

Judge Lundin makes an interesting point. If the confirmation injunction in Travelers was valid regardless of whether the Bankruptcy Court arguably exceeded its subject matter jurisidction, wouldn't it follow that an order confirming a chapter 13 plan would be entitled to similar respect even if the debtor failed to comply with the procedural niceties for commencing an adversary proceeding.

Will Espinosa Extend the Reach of Shoaf?

The outcome in Espinosa will have significant repercussions in the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit has three opinions holding that a provision in a plan cannot determine the allowance of a claim or the secured status of the claim. In re Taylor, 132 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 1998)(chapter 11 plan could not establish amount of responsible person liability at $0); In re Howard, 972 F.2d 639 (5th Cir. 1992)(chapter 13 plan could not reduce amount of secured claim to $500); In re Simmons, 765 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1985)(no res judicata effect for chapter 13 plan which erroneously listed claim as unsecured). The Fifth Circuit has held that this trio of cases is an exception to the general rule contained in Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf, 815 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1987) that unobjected to provisions in a plan are enforceable based on res judicata. Since the rationale in the Simmons trio was that additional procedural requirements were required to affect a claim, an opinion upholding Espinosa could undermine these precedents.

Monday, June 15, 2009

Chapter 11 in Texas: Introduction to the 2008 Cases

Enron filed in the Southern District of New York. However, there are still chapter 11 cases being filed in Texas. During 2008, there were a total of 701 chapter 11 cases filed in Texas. This will be the first of a series of posts examining the Class of 2008. In future posts, I hope to look at who filed, who represented them and how many were successful.

Where Do Texas Chapter 11s File?

In this post, I will look at something more basic: where did the cases file. The answer is that more chapter 11 cases are filed in big cities than in small towns. While there is nothing surprising about the fact that more chapter 11s were filed in Dallas or Houston than in Lubbock, it is interesting that some large metropolitan areas attract a disproportionate number of cases.

The cases were distributed among the four districts of Texas as follows:

Southern District of Texas--271
Northern District of Texas--249
Western District of Texas---102
Eastern District of Texas----79

Of the cases filed in Texas, 663 originated within Texas and 38 were filed by out of state debtors. During 2007 (which is the most recent year available), the population of Texas was 23,904,380. That means that on average, there was one chapter 11 filed for every 36,055 residents. However, that does not mean that every county with at least 36,055 residents could claim a chapter 11 of their very own. Indeed, some 29 counties with at least this much population, including Midland and Taylor did not have any cases. Instead, the cases were skewed toward the larger counties.

The 20 largest counties gave rise to 589 filings for an 89.7% share of the total cases originating from Texas. These counties only contain 71% of the state's population. Thus, it appears that the large counties get a disproportionately large share of the filings compared to the state at large. This is not true across the board. The county with the lowest ratio of residents to filings was humble Camp county. This county had seven filings (all related to Pilgrim's Pride) and a population of 12,557 for a rate of one chapter 11 case for every 1,794 residents.

When the filings per population are compared between the 20 largest counties, there is a definite bias in favor of the Dallas/Fort Worth and Houston megaplexes.

The term Ch.11PP refers to Chapter 11 cases filed per population. A low number means that more cases were filed than would be predicted by the population, while a high number indicates the reverse.

While there is not a complete correlation, counties in the D/FW and Houston area, including Collin, Dallas, Denton, Harris and Tarrant, a a lower Ch.11PP rate (meaning had more cases than would be predicted strictly by population) than the rest of the state. However, some of the outlying counties in the Houston megaplex, including Fort Bend, Montgomery, Brazoria and Galveston counties, had fewer cases than would be expected. The border counties did not show a clear trend. Webb and Cameron counties had higher filing rates, while El Paso, Bexar and Hidalgo counties were in the bottom group. Rounding out the less than expected group were Travis, Nueces, Jefferson and Bell Counties (although Travis was just about average, one of the rare occasions that designation will be applied to the capital of Keeping It Weird).

Why?

Why do cases flock toward some localities and avoid others? Access to judges may be part of the answer. Harris County has four resident judges, while Dallas county has three. On the other hand, Lubbock County, Jefferson County and El Paso County all share judges with other divisions. However, this does not explain Bexar County, which has two resident judges but a low filing rate. Access to the chapter 11 bar may be a factor. Many of the counties which had lower rates of filings were outliers from major metropolitan areas. Montgomery, Fort Bend, Brazoria and Galveston Counties are all part of the Houston megaplex with lower than expected filing rates. If most of the chapter 11 lawyers are located in Houston, individuals and small businesses in outlying areas might be deterred from hiring a lawyer in the big city. Another possibility may be that the types of business prevalent in an area might influence the filing rate. For example, areas with high amounts of agriculture (Lubbock, Nueces) seem to be lower in filings. Suburban areas have very inconsistent results, with Denton, Collin and Williamson Counties ranking high and Ft. Bend, Montgomery and Brazoria counties ranking low.

If you would like a copy of the chart which is easier to read, please send an email to ssather@bnpclaw.com.

Coming Attraction

The next installment of the Class of 2008 will look at the flameouts, the cases that were dismissed or converted in the first 90 days. Although I have not done the research yet, I suspect that paying the filing fee in installments may be an indicator that a case is on rocky ground. I am amazed at just how many cases there are in this category.

Friday, June 12, 2009

Another View on Chrysler

The Chrysler deal has now closed, proving that it is possible to do a multi-billion dollar asset sale on an expedited timetable when the U.S. government is your DIP lender and is directing the pace. I am still scratching my head at the ease with which this deal went through. In the realm where I practice, an attempt to sell the debtor's assets to a purchaser selected by management for a small fraction of the secured debt would not only be denied, but would likely be followed by a motion for sanctions. However, when you are dealing with a debtor whose failure could send nuclear shock waves across the economy, it may be that the strict legalities give way to more pragmatic considerations.

Here is a pragmatic analysis from guest-blogger Steve Roberts.

How about this.

If the government did not step in, Chrysler would shut down and go into liquidation and the senior lenders with $6.9 billion in debt would be paid less than the $2 billion or 29 cents on the dollar the government is offering them.

So the government is using your and my money to bail out the lenders along with everyone else. But holdouts among the lenders are screaming that their constitutional and statutory rights are being violated because inferior claims are getting more.


Lets look at that. Who do we, the taxpayers, need if there is any chance for us to get our money back? The the supply chain and the workers. Without them there is no bailout and the senior lenders would get less. So New Chrysler cuts the unions into the deal and assumes the supply contracts with the suppliers to maintain the supply chain.

The Indiana pension funds, who are the last holdouts among the senior lenders, say that the government is hurting the teachers and state employees of Indiana with this bailout, so let's examine that. The fund managers for these funds bought Chrysler debt in or after 2007 and paid 43 cents on the dollar for it, betting that Chrysler would survive. They were wrong. They did not lose money because the government stepped in. They lost money because they lost on the risk they took.

These fund managers have said publicly in this case that they will settle for 50 cents on the dollar, a neat 7 cent profit. And since the government will not use your and my money to bail these fund managers out for their miscalculation, they are appealing the approval of the sale to the 2nd Circuit on an emergency basis.

They must be betting that the government will pay them more if they win and are willing to take the risk that the government will not let the bailout fail.


Since Steve wrote this analysis, both the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court refused to block the sale and it has now closed.

However, I think it highlights what an unusual case this is. Chrysler was not a meaningful player in its own bankruptcy. Instead, the case tested how much the treasury was willing to pay to avoid the collateral damage from a Chrysler failure. The senior lenders (or at least the holdouts) were not banks which had lent money directly to the debtor, but rather speculators who had bought the debt in the hopes of making of a profit. As Steve correctly points out, the objecting creditors, having seen that the government was in the bailout business, wanted a bailout of their own investment decision. The government stood firm and was backed up by the courts.

What I really want to know is how can I use this precedent in my next single asset real estate case?

Wednesday, May 27, 2009

The Bankruptcy Opinions of Sonia Sotomayor

Yesterday President Obama nominated Second Circuit judge Sonia Sotomayor to take David Souter's place on the Supreme Court. As a District Court Judge in the Southern District of New York and as a Judge on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Sotomayor has come across bankruptcy issues from time to time. However, few of her opinions are the stuff that casebooks are made of.

Big Bankruptcies: Routine Opinions

One consequence of sitting in New York is that Judge Sotomayor has written opinions in some major cases,such as Adelphia, Bethlehem Steel, Eastern Airlines, R.H. Macy & Co. and Worldcom. In In re Adelphia Communications Corporation, 544 F.3d 420 (2nd Cir. 2008), she affirmed the confirmation of a bankruptcy plan which transferred claims being asserted by an Equity Committee to a plan trust. The problem was that the Equity Committee, which was far out of the money, had confused derivative standing to pursue claims on behalf of the estate with ownership of the claims themselves. As Judge Sotomayor stated:

We do not mean to trivialize, but only to place in context, the role of the derivative plaintiff. It serves "with the approval and supervision of a bankruptcy court" and shares the "labor" of litigation with the debtor-in-possession. (citation omitted). Contrary to the Equity Committee's arguments, however, it does not usurp the central role of the court or debtor in overseeing and managing the estate's legal claims.
In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 467 F.3d 73 (2nd 2005), an interesting provision of Sarbanes-Oxley came into play. The SEC brought claims on behalf of defrauded investors, which the debtor settled. The SEC then proposed its plan for distributing those funds to the investors. The Unsecured Creditors Committee didn't like the SEC's plan (which was separate from the plan of reorganization in the case). Judge Sotomayor held that the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors had standing to appeal, even though it was not a party to the SEC action, but ruled against them on the merits. In another Worldcom appeal, she held that the confirmed plan of reorganization barred pursuit of a discharged claim. In re Worldcom, Inc., 546 F.3d 211 (2nd Cir. 2008).

In another case, the judge ruled that employee benefits earned by an employee over the course of his employment but payable when he was discharged during the bankruptcy were not entitled to administrative claim status because the right to payment had accrued pre-petition. In re Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 479 F.3d 167 (2nd Cir. 2007).

As a district court judge, she ruled on an appeal concerning whether a tax assessed post-petition and payable under an unexpired lease which was later rejected was entitled to administrative priority. She affirmed the ruling of the Bankruptcy Court which had found it to be an administrative claim. In re R.H. Macy & Co., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21364 (S.D. N.Y. 2004). The most interesting thing about this opinion is that it consists of a transcript of her discussion with counsel on the record before she made her ruling. She displays a bit of humanity when she apologizes to counsel for her delay in ruling and acknowledges some unfamiliarity with the bankruptcy issues.

THE COURT: How are you counsel? I must apologize for the delay in addressing this case. There is no excuse other than the press of life in general in the court-house. You have also presented me with interesting issues, so once I did turn my attention to it, it has not been easy for me to resolve.

I have a series of questions for those of you who are bankruptcy lawyers. I would like to have you educate me and focus me a little bit.

In the Eastern Airlines case, the Bankruptcy Court approved a comprehensive settlement between the Debtor and the Airline Pilots Association. A group of dissident pilots objected to the settlement and appealed. Judge Sotomayor found that the settlement was not an abuse of discretion. Nellis v. Shugrue, 165 B.R. 115 (S.D. N.Y. 1994).

International Insolvency

Judge Sotomayor has also had a passing acquaintance with international insolvency cases. In In re Board of Directors of Telecom Argentina, S.A., 528 F.3d 162 (2nd Cir. 2008), she affirmed the decision to recognize a foreign proceeding under former Section 304. In Petition of Alison J. Treco and David Patrick Hamilton as liquidators of Meridien International Bank Ltd., 205 B.R. 358 (S.D. N.Y. 1997) and Allstate Insurance Company v. Hughes, 174 B.R. 884 (S.D. N.Y. 1994) she affirmed the granting of a Section 304 injunction to protect the assets of a foreign debtor.

Dischargeability of Debts

Judge Sotomayor has written several opinions dealing with dischargeability of marital obligations. In re Maddigan, 312 F.3d 589 (2nd Cir. 2002)(attorney's fees incurred in connection with support claim were nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(5)); Beier v. Beier, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1702 (S.D. N.Y. 1995)(granting summary judgment on non-dischargeability was inappropriate when there were issues of fact)

She also ruled that in determining the dischargeability of a claim arising under a settlement agreement, it was appropriate to look to the facts surrounding the underlying claim. In re DeTrano, 326 F.3d 319 (2nd Cir. 2003).

In European American Bank v. Benedict, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10051 (S.D. N.Y. 1995),Judge Sotomayor ruled that the deadline to file a complaint to determine dischargeability could not be extended after the expiration of the deadline.

Other Rulings

In re Millenium Seacarriers, Inc., 419 F.3d 83 (2nd Cir. 2005)(bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over property of the estate wherever located included jurisdiction to extinguish maritime liens).

Harris v. Albany County Office, 464 F.3d 263 (2nd Cir. 2006)(dismissing appeal based upon failure to provide designation of record on appeal and transcript was abuse of discretion where debtor was not given opportunity to cure defect first)

Beightol v. UBS Painewebber, Inc., 354 F.3d 187 (2nd Cir. 2004)(no appeal from order denying motion to abstain)

In re New Haven Projects Ltd. Liability Co., 225 F.3d 283 (2nd Cir. 2000)(where Section 505 gave bankruptcy court discretionary authority to redetermine tax liability it was not error for bankruptcy court to decline to exercise that authority).

In re Seatrain Lines, Inc., 198 B.R. 45 (S.D. N.Y. 1996)(debtor's action against insurer which denied indemnification post-petition was core proceeding so that reference would not be withdrawn).

Royal American Insurance Co. v. McCrory Corporation, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5552 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)(bankruptcy court erred in refusing to lift stay to pursue suit against debtor's insurance carrier despite fact that claimant had failed to file a timely claim against debtor).

In re St. Johnsbury Trucking Company, Inc., 191 B.R. 22 (S.D. N.Y. 1995)(Negotiated Rates Act of 1993 was constitutional as applied in bankruptcy, but issue would be certified for interlocutory appeal).

First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Eleven Hundred Metroplex Associates, 190 B.R. 510 (S.D. N.Y. 1995)(order for use of cash collateral reversed where debtor made absolute assignment of rents)

In re Friedman & Shapiro, Inc., 185 B.R. 143 (S.D. N.Y. 1995)(disciplinary proceeding against attornrey by state bar could not be removed based upon law firm's pending bankruptcy).

Kuntz v. Pardo, 160 B.R. 35 (S.D. N.Y. 1993)(litigant whose appeal was dismissed for failure to designate record did not demonstrate excusable neglect entitling him to reinstatement of appeal)

The Bottom Line

In ten years as a circuit court judge, Judge Sotomayor has authored 232 opinions, twelve of which have concerned substantive bankruptcy issues. In eleven out of twelve cases, she affirmed the lower courts. Remarkably, her six year record as a district court judge contains many bankruptcy rulings. Her bankruptcy opinions appear to be competently written, although none jump out as having changed the face of the law.

For another perspective on the Sotomayor nomination, go to The Case Against Sonia Sotomayor: Arch-Conservative .

Wednesday, May 13, 2009

Lawyers, Guns and Money

"Send lawyers, guns and money."--Warren Zevon (1978).

A new opinion out of San Antonio (home to the Alamo) contains the elements of lawyers, guns and money in a decision about exempting firearms. In re Wilkinson, No. 07-50189 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 4/10/09). While I enjoyed the analysis, I don't think I would have arrived at the same conclusion. (Of course, I don't wear a black robe, so whether I agree or disagree is somewhat academic).

Dr. Wilkinson had guns. Lots of guns. Some of them could shoot. Others were mounted on the wall with brass plates describing them. The Debtor sought to keep two guns under the firearms exemption, but also sought to keep the mounted guns as home furnishings. The trustee cried foul, arguing that "firearms are firearms and cannot be claimed under another category such as 'home furnishings.'"

The Debtor's first shot (pun intended) was to point to a statute which said that antique or curio guns manufactured before 1899 were not guns. Texas Penal Code Sec. 46.01. This was a nice try, since the creative debtor's lawyer found a statute which said that the mounted guns were not legally firearms. However, this shot was easily deflected by the judge. The Penal Code dealt with guns which could not be possessed by felons. Since guns which cannot go bang are not inherently dangerous in the hands of a felon, their possession should not be criminalized. However, the statute didn't really answer the question of whether antique firearms mounted on plaques should be excluded from the definition of firearms under an exemption statute.

Next, the court considered the definition of firearm in common parlance. The court noted that:

Notably, none of these definitions excludes antique firearms or guns from the definition of what constitutes a firearm. None of these definitions requires that the item be in working order to constitute a firearm.
Opinion, p. 11.

The Court then went on an interesting historical analysis which demonstrated that guns have not always been sancrosanct in Texas. The Court noted that in Choate v. Redding, 18 Tex. 579 (1857), the Texas Supreme Court bemoaned the fact that there was no exemption for guns in Texas. This was especially troubling because Texas law required that every able-bodied man bring a gun in connection with their militia service. (This was back in the good old days when gun ownership was not only allowed but mandated!) Thus, if a creditor levied upon a debtor's non-exempt gun and he was called up for militia service, the debtor could be punished for showing up disarmed.

The lackadaisical legislature did not allow a gun to be exempted until 1870 and tardily expanded this exemption to two guns in 1973. The court concluded that because the legislature had to be dragged kicking and screaming to allow even two guns to be exempted that it would not allow more than that to be exempted under the guise of home furnishings.

I find the historical analysis interesting. I had always thought that the exemption for two guns was meant to allow Pa to shoot one gun out the front door while Ma defended the back of the house. Since the exemption for two guns did not come around until 1973 when the risk of marauding indians was substantially diminished, this assumption was probably incorrect. Hopefully none of my clients who I told this story to will ask for their money back.

However, I think that the court was asking the wrong question. The Debtor sought to exempt the mounted firearms as home furnishings rather than as firearms. Thus, the relevant question should be whether a mounted gun which doesn't go bang could be considered to be a home furnishing. A home furnishing is something that is used to furnish a home. (While I don't have any authority for this proposition, it is based on the close proximity between home and furnishing in the statute). Texans are granted great leeway in deciding how they will furnish their homes. They may decide to decorate their homes with tasteful artwork bought in galleries in Santa Fe and Taos or they may decide to build elaborate displays of Lone Star beer bottles and photographs of road kill. Likewise, both a display case containing pre-Columbian pottery and a collection of sweatstained tshirts from the Capital 10,000 neatly mounted in a shadow box could be a home furnishing. How you furnish your home is largely in the eyes of the beholder.

In my mind, whether a gun is exempt as a gun or a home furnishing depends on how it is actually used. If it is kept in a gun safe with suitable ammunition nearby, it is only exempt as a firearm or possibly as a tool of the trade in the case of a law enforcement officer. On the other hand, if it is mounted and the wall and doesn't go bang, then it is probably being used as an adornment or decoration and thus would fit the definition of a home furnishing. Just because the same item could potentially be exempted under one category should not prohibit it from being claimed under another applicable provision. Function, not origin, should determine the appropriate category for exemption. The mounted firearms seem an easy case to me. The harder case would be the debtor who decorated the inside of his closet with $60,000 worth of gold bullion. If the interest in decorating with gold arose on the eve of bankruptcy and the gold was not prominently displayed to visitors, that would probably not be a real home furnishing.

Tuesday, May 05, 2009

Court Clears the Way for Simultantaneous Causes of Action Based on Discharge Violation

Nature abhors a vacuum. When Congress restricted access to bankruptcy in 2005, many debtor’s lawyers became plaintiff’s lawyers, filing suit over automatic stay and discharge violations which might have been allowed to pass in an earlier time. Not only are debtor’s lawyers suing more often, they are also asserting more causes of action as illustrated by a recent opinion from the Western District of Texas. Eastman v. Baker Recovery Services, Adv. No. 08-5055 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 4/17/09).

Eastman shows a common fact pattern. A debtor filed a no asset case and failed to schedule a creditor. The unscheduled creditor later filed suit. The debtor did not answer the suit, but did inform the creditor of the discharge. The creditor took a default judgment. Several years later, after the debtor moved to reopen her bankruptcy case, the creditor finally had the judgment vacated. The debtor then filed an adversary proceeding for violation of the discharge after the judgment had been vacated. However, the debtor not only filed suit for violation of the discharge, but for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Texas Debt Collection Practices Act, the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and “tortiously engaged in practices that rise to the intentional infliction of emotional distress” (whatever that means).

This case shows a pattern of escalating failures which is not that unusual. The debtor blundered by not listing the creditor. However, because the case was a no-asset case, the debt was still subject to discharge. The creditor’s initial action to file suit in violation of the discharge was innocent because the creditor did not have notice of the bankruptcy case. The debtor blundered a second time when it did not answer the state court lawsuit. The creditor blundered when it took a judgment after being informed of the discharge. The debtor showed a curious indifference to her own rights when she waited for over a year to remedy the discharge violation. The creditor showed a cavalier disregard for its own liability when it waited until after the debtor had moved to reopen the bankruptcy case before it got around to vacating the judgment.

This case raises two issues 1) Can the same violation of the discharge give rise to multiple causes of action? and 2) Does the Bankruptcy Court have jurisdiction to hear all of them? Judge Clark answered yes to both questions.

There is currently a split between courts as to whether a discharge violation is also actionable under the FDCPA and other statutes. The Ninth Circuit holds that the bankruptcy discharge preempts other laws so that a plaintiff may not assert both causes of action. Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502 (9th Cir. 2002). On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit holds that one federal statute cannot preempt another and that implied repeal of another federal statute should not be done on less than imperative grounds. Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368. F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 2004). Judge Clark sided with the Seventh Circuit, finding that both federal causes of action could be asserted simultaneously. However, he went one step further and found that the state causes of action were not preempted either.

However, what is really interesting about this opinion is that Judge Clark also ruled that he had jurisdiction to consider all of the claims in one action. In doing so, he disagreed with Judge Clark. In Mahoney v. Washington Mutual , Judge Clark dismissed state law claims which arose from the same facts as an alleged discharge violation because they did not have any conceivable effect on the bankruptcy estate. In so ruling, Judge Clark followed the test for “related to” jurisdiction which has long been followed in the Fifth Circuit.

So, why did Judge Clark disagree with Judge Clark? The difference was an intervening Fifth Circuit decision. In Matter of Morrison, 555 F.3d 473 (5th Cir. 2009), the Fifth Circuit upheld a decision by a bankruptcy court which held a debt to be nondischargeable and entered a money judgment on the claim. The Fifth Circuit found that judicial efficiency should not require a creditor obtaining a finding of nondischargeability to file a separate action to obtain a judgment on the claim. Judge Clark found that the same logic applied in this situation as well. He said:

A similar rationale warrants a similar exercise of jurisdiction here. The action for violation of the discharge injunction is a core proceeding, one that arises under a provision of title 11. (citation omitted). The selfsame facts make out a case for violation of the FDCPA. There would be no judicial efficiency in requiring the beneficiary of a judgment finding the defendant liable for violating the discharge injunction to pursue a separate lawsuit in state or federal court in order to secure a money judgment against the defendant. (citation omitted). Thus, the court concludes, under the reasoning of Morrison, that it has the requisite subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the FDCPA cause of action.

Eastman, at 8.

If Judge Clark is correct, “related to” jurisdiction has substantially expanded in the Fifth Circuit. If a Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction over a claim, then it also has jurisdiction over other claims arising from the same facts in the name of judicial efficiency. This conclusion is somewhat of a two-edged sword. On the one hand, it expands the Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction to include what would be known as supplemental jurisdiction for an Article III Court. However, it also undermines the ability of a plaintiff to pursue separate bankruptcy and state court claims arising from the same facts on the ground that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to hear the non-bankruptcy claims.

Monday, May 04, 2009

His English Teacher Would Be Proud

Many of us forgot the formal rules of grammatical construction as fast as we could, but not Justice Breyer. In an opinion today, he delivered a grammatical tour de force.

There are strong textual reasons for rejecting the Government’s position. As a matter of ordinary English grammar, it seems natural to read the statute’s word “knowingly” as applying to all the subsequently listed elements of the crime. The Government cannot easily claim that the word “knowingly” applies only to the statutes first four words, or even its first seven. It makes little sense to read the provision’s language as heavily penalizing a person who “transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority” a something, but does not know, at the very least, that the “something” (perhaps inside a box) is a “means of identification.” Would we apply a statute that makes it unlawful “knowingly to possess drugs” to a person who steals a passenger’s bag without knowing that the bag has drugs inside?

The Government claims more forcefully that the word “knowingly” applies to all but the statute’s last three words, i.e., “of another person.” The statute, the Government says, does not require a prosecutor to show that the defendant knows that the means of identification the defendant has unlawfully used in fact belongs to another person. But how are we to square this reading with the statute’s language?

In ordinary English, where a transitive verb has an object, listeners in most contexts assume that an adverb (such as knowingly) that modifies the transitive verb tells the listener how the subject performed the entire action, including the object as set forth in the sentence. Thus, if a bank official says, “Smith knowingly transferred the funds to his brother’s account,” we would normally understand the bank official’s statement as telling us that Smith knew the account was his brother’s. Nor would it matter if the bank official said “Smith knowingly transferred the funds to the account of his brother.” In either instance, if the bank official later told us that Smith did not know the account belonged to Smith’s brother, we should besurprised.

Of course, a statement that does not use the word “knowingly” may be unclear about just what Smith knows. Suppose Smith mails his bank draft to Tegucigalpa, which (perhaps unbeknownst to Smith) is the capital of Honduras. If the bank official says, “Smith sent a bank draft to the capital of Honduras,” he has expressed next to nothing about Smith’s knowledge of that geographic identity. But if the official were to say, “Smith knowingly sent a bank draft to the capital of Honduras,” then the official has suggested that Smith knows his geography.

Flores-Figeroa v. United States, No. 08-108 (U.S. 5/4/09).

Justice Alito, who was also paying attention in English class, wrote separately to express his opinion on how the word knowingly should be used.

While I am in general agreement with the opinion of the Court, I write separately because I am concerned that the Court’s opinion may be read by some as adopting an overly rigid rule of statutory construction. The Court says that “[i]n ordinary English, where a transitive verb has an object, listeners in most contexts assume that an adverb (such as knowingly) that modifies the transitive verb tells the listener how the subject performed the entire action, including the object as set forth in the sentence.” Ante, at 4. The Court adds that counterexamples are “not easy to find,” ante,at 5, and I suspect that the Court’s opinion will be cited for the proposition that the mens rea of a federal criminal statute nearly always applies to every element of the offense.

I think that the Court’s point about ordinary English usage is overstated. Examples of sentences that do not conform to the Court’s rule are not hard to imagine. For example: “The mugger knowingly assaulted two people in the park—an employee of company X and a jogger from town Y.” A person hearing this sentence would not likely assume that the mugger knew about the first victim’s employer or the second victim’s home town. What matters in this example, and the Court’s, is context.

More to the point, ordinary writers do not often construct the particular kind of sentence at issue here, i.e., a complex sentence in which it is important to determine from the sentence itself whether the adverb denoting the actor’s intent applies to every characteristic of the sentence’s direct object. Such sentences are a staple of criminal codes, but in ordinary speech, a different formulation is almost always used when the speaker wants to be clear on the point. For example, a speaker might say: “Flores-Figueroa used a Social Security number that he knew belonged to someone else” or “Flores-Figueroa used a Social Security number that just happened to belong to a real person.” But it is difficult to say with the confidence the Court conveys that there is an “ordinary” understanding of the usage of the phrase at issue in this case.

While Flores-Figeroa is a criminal opinion, it pays to be in the know about how to construe knowingly in bankruptcy court as well. I hope that these excerpts make everything perfectly clear.

Sunday, May 03, 2009

Chrysler Seeks the Ultimate 363 Sale as the Treasury Department Dictates the Pace

Chrysler, LLC filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy on April 30 with the United States Treasury firmly in the driver’s seat (pun intended). In its first day filings, Chrysler announced that it would be seeking $4.5 billion in DIP financing from the Treasury and that it intended to affect a sale of substantially all of its assets to a newly created entity within 60 days. The U.S. Treasury filed a statement concurring in the filing and noting that its commitment to provide DIP financing was conditioned on timely filing and approval of the motion for sale of assets free and clear of liens.

Chrysler’s Woes

According to Chrysler’s filings, it is “one of the most agile and innovative car manufacturers in the world” whose name is “synonymous with innovative engineering” and whose liquidation “would have significant adverse impacts on the nation’s economy.” However, the filings also show (or at least imply) that the company took on too much debt in a leveraged buyout, failed to keep up with technology and mortgaged its future to payment of employee benefits.

While Chrysler bills itself as “the quintessential American automobile company,” its present difficulties as well as its plan for recovery arise from European alliances. In 1998, Chrysler merged with German automaker Daimler-Benz. At the time, the company was healthy and had cash reserves of $7.5 billion. The German alliance didn’t work out and Chrysler went private in a leveraged buyout in 2007. As part of this transaction, Chrysler incurred $10 billion in first lien debt (which has been paid down to $7 billion). According to Chrysler, this first lien debt is now trading at 15 cents on the dollar. It also incurred $2 billion in second lien debt from affiliates of its shareholders, including $1.5 billion from Daimler Financial. When Chrysler encountered financial difficulty last year, it received $4 billion in TARP funds from the U.S. Treasury, which are secured by a third lien. In addition to these secured debts, Chrysler owes $5.4 billion in trade debt, $1 million on its Amex cards and is required to spend $6.7 billion for settlement of claims relating to employee health care benefits. As will be discussed later, Chrysler's exit strategy in this case involves an alliance with Fiat.

Beginning in February 2007, the company began paring down its offerings to those which had the best sales and margins. Three of those identified in this class were the Jeep Grand Cherokee, the Dodge Ram truck and the Chrysler Town & Country minivan. All of these were large and not very fuel efficient. The implication is that Chrysler doesn't do so well in the market for fuel efficient cars, an impression reinforced by Chrysler's statements about the benefits of obtaining small car technology from Fiat.

According to Chrysler, it was hit hard by the financial crisis in the fall of 2008. When the market for securitizations imploded, there was no longer a means to sell auto loans to obtain new capital. Additionally, with the economy in free fall, people stopped buying vehicles. Chrysler points to sales in January to March of 2009, which were 35-37% below sales during the same months in 2008. In December 2008, Chrysler idled its plants for one month (with some staying closed longer).

One requirement of accepting the TARP money (which Chrysler notes that “many other large corporate pillars of the economy” requested), was that Chrysler had to submit a Viability Plan to the government and show its progress in meeting certain benchmarks. The government told Chrysler that it would support its working capital needs up through April 30 and required it to negotiate agreements with its creditors, the UAW and its proposed partner Fiat within this time. Chrysler reports that it reached the required agreements with almost all constituencies and filed bankruptcy on April 30 to implement the plan.

The Proposed Sale

While Chrysler paints a glowing picture of the progress it has made in negotiating with stakeholders, the U.S. Treasury has indicated that it is holding a gun to the company’s head and requires a sale to be approved and closed within 60 days. According to a statement released on behalf of Acting U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York Lev Dassin:

The President has made clear that the United States cannot commit to fund Chrysler if the company’s restructuring lacks a realistic probability of success. Treasury cannot and will not make an open-ended commitment to Chrysler for billions of dollars more, especially in light of the myriad other meritorious, competing demands for the public’s resources; its commitment to fund Chrysler’s bankruptcy must be contingent on Chrysler achieving the milestones necessary to close a sale in sixty days. Simply put, this time period for a sale is a necessary and critical condition to government funding.

Statement of the United States Department of the Treasury in Support of the Commencement of Chrysler, LLC’s Chapter 11 Case, p. 5.

As a condition of providing DIP financing, the government has required that Chrysler adhere to the following schedule in selling its assets:

May 4: File 363 motion
May 9: Hearing to approve sales procedures
May 10: Have final and non-appealable order entered
May 20: Receive bids
May 29: In court auction
June 1: Hearing to approve sale
June 15: Entry of final and non-appealable order approving sale
June 27: Close the 363 sale.

If Chrysler fails to meet this timeline, the Treasury reserves the right to cut off funding and drive the company into liquidation.

The United States Treasury, in addition to being a pre-petition lender and post-petition lender is also a proposed equity holder in the stalking horse bidder. Under the proposed 363 motion, Chrysler’s operating assets will be transferred to New Chrysler of which the United States will be an 8% interest holder.

The proposed transaction consists of the following elements:

1. Chrysler will transfer substantially all of its operating assets to New Chrysler.
2. New Chrysler will assume” certain liabilities” of Chrysler and pay $2 billion in cash to Chrysler.

3. Fiat will contribute “to New Chrysler access to competitive fuel-efficient vehicle platforms, certain technology, distribution capabilities in key growth markets and substantial cost saving opportunities” (whatever that means).

4. New Chrysler will be owned 55% by a Voluntary Employees Beneficiary Association, 8% by the United States, 2% by Canada and 20% by Fiat (with the right to increase its stake to 51%).

Although $2 billion is to be paid to Chrysler, it states that it anticipates that no cash will remain in the company. Instead, the company will be left with eight manufacturing plants which are not being transferred.

The documents filed so far are somewhat vague about which “certain liabilities” will be assumed. However, Chrysler’s declaration does state that the company’s largest first lien creditors, JP Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and Citigroup, have agreed to write off 70% of their debt and that the $2 billion in second lien debt owed to Chrysler’s shareholders, Daimler Financial and Cerberus Capital, will be forgiven. The shareholders will also be required to fund hundreds of millions of dollars in pension liabilities. It does not expressly say what will happen to the U.S. government's third lien debt or the company's trade debt.

Implications

This is certainly an unprecedented case. However, the extent to which the United States is directing the outcome of the proceeding raises some major issues.

First, is this a sub rosa plan? The Second Circuit has held that sub rosa plans cannot be part of a Section 363 sale. In re Iridium Operating, LLC, 478 F.3d 452 (2nd Cir. 2007) (“The trustee is prohibited from such use, sale or lease if it would amount to a sub rosa plan of reorganization. The reason sub rosa plans are prohibited is based on a fear that a debtor-in-possession will enter into transactions that will, in effect, "short circuit the requirements of Chapter 11 for confirmation of a reorganization plan.").

The proposed sale transaction looks like it is rearranging the priorities of creditors, which would be a clear sign of a sub rosa plan. Based on what has been disclosed so far, first lien holders will receive only 28% of their claims and second lien holders will receive nothing. However, nothing is said about the third lien held by the United States or the trade creditor claims. Allowing junior claims to participate without payment in full of senior claims is a clear violation of the absolute priority rule unless the parties vote in favor of the plan. Since there is no voting on a sale, how can this consent take place?

Additionally, the sale motion essentially dictates the post-reorganization ownership of New Chrysler, allocating it between employee benefits, the United States and Canadian governments and Fiat. Dictating who will own the reorganized debtor is another sure sign of a sub rosa plan. Some clever lawyering was used to try to avoid this problem. The 363 motion will not dictate that the company is sold to New Chrysler, only that it will be the stalking horse bidder. However, given the extremely short time frame dictated by the U.S. Treasury, there is no meaningful opportunity for outsiders to bid.

There are also some very interesting separations of power issues. Typically, a bankruptcy judge would not allow a DIP lender to dictate that all of the company’s assets be sold within 60 days. However, in this case, the President of the United States, acting through the Treasury Department is the one dictating the result. Should the judicial branch defer to the executive branch in this instance or should the court be free to say no to the President. This one is easily answered. The Bankruptcy Judge can veto the Treasury Department’s terms for post-petition lending, but cannot force the Treasury Department to lend. Thus, the Judge must decide whether he is willing to take the responsibility for killing Chrysler. While this is an unfair burden to place on a judge, he is still free to act.

The other interesting question is how the U.S. Trustee can be an effective watchdog for the case when the President and the Treasury Department are potentially overstepping their bounds in directing how the case will proceed. Technically, there are separate lines of authority, since the Treasury Department is appearing through the U.S. Attorney and the U.S. Trustee is part of the Justice Department. However, they are both part of the United States executive branch with the President at the top. In a lower profile case, this might not be a problem. However, in a case of this magnitude, it seems like the U.S. Trustee is placed in a no win situation. However, I am not aware of any provision which allows someone outside of the executive branch to step in for the U.S. Trustee in the event of a conflict.

It will be interesting to see how Judge Gonzales and the U.S. Trustee navigate this minefield.

The Human Face of Bankruptcy

This week I received an unhappy call from the wife of a debtor whose case I had written about. Although the article was posted nearly two years ago, someone had recently told her that her husband's name was mentioned on the internet. She found this very distressing. I tried to explain to her that I was merely reporting on a published opinion by a United States Bankruptcy Judge. In the background, her husband was telling her that I could not use his name without permission and that I was just trying to make money from my blog (neither one of which was true). She insisted that her husband had done nothing wrong notwithstanding the judge's ruling to the contrary.

In the end, I decided to redact the article to remove the name of the debtor and replace it with "Name Withheld by Request." I was not under any obligation to do this, since the debtor's name was part of a published opinion. However, she seemed so clueless about what had happened. She sincerely believed that everything which had happened in the case was the fault of the lawyers and the judge. She was very embarrassed that people in their small town could know about their problems. Although I had very little sympathy for the husband (who was found to have committed bad acts by Judge Bohm and who was very threatening in the background of the conversation), I did feel sorry for this very confused and embarrassed woman.

I don't know that I would do it again, because it is difficult to talk about cases without mentioning their names. However, it does point out that behind every case is a human being. When we talk about Marrama, Geiger and Cohen, these are not just Supreme Court cases, but also the names of individuals who have been immortalized in the case reporters. At the same time, I don't think that a lot of debtors fully comprehend the seriousness of what they are undertaking. As former Bankruptcy Judge Larry Kelly was fond of saying, "When you filed bankruptcy, you made a federal case out of it." Bankruptcy is a matter of public record and the unfortunate few who get their names mentioned in unfavorable written opinions will find that the memory of their deeds lives on in written pages and the increasingly on the internet.

While the name of this particular debtor is no longer mentioned on my blog, anyone can go to 366 B.R. 677 to read all about his case. I wonder if Mr. Name Withheld By Request will try to sue West Publishing for using his name without permission?

Sunday, April 26, 2009

Pennsylvania Judge Writes Epic Opinion on Technology and Professional Responsibility

Technology has dramatically changed the practice of law. Thanks to Westlaw and Lexis, it is no longer necessary to keep large expensive libraries. PACER and ECF have made court filings and filing documents available 24/7. I recently observed a case where the parties used GoToMeeting to handle thousands of pages of exhibits electronically. All of these developments have made the practice of law more efficient. However, a recent opinion from Judge Diane Weiss Sigmund highlights that professionals must be masters of the technology rather than being mastered by it. In re Taylor, No. 07-15385 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 4/15/09).

The Taylor case started with a simple question that comes up frequently in consumer bankruptcy cases: Why couldn’t the creditor’s lawyer get a payment history? The answer given to this question prompted Judge Sigmund to launch a one year investigation into the technology behind the case and how it was being used and to award some very creative sanctions. The Judge authored a 58 page opinion ”to share my education with participants in the bankruptcy system who may be similarly unfamiliar with the extent that a third party intermediary drives the Chapter 13 process.” Opinion, p. 30.

What Happened

Taylor involved a chapter 13 filing to try to keep a house. Two firms appeared on behalf of HSBC, the mortgage holder. A national firm filed a proof of claim, while a local firm filed a motion for relief from stay and responded to an objection to claim. All three documents were defective. The proof of claim attached the wrong mortgage and listed the wrong payment amount. The motion for relief from stay recited that the debtors had failed to make their post-petition payments for three months, when in fact they had been making the payments, but at a lower amount due to a dispute over flood insurance. According to the Court, “at the time the Stay Motion was filed, the Debtors were short $360 for payments more than 60-days overdue, a fact not clear from the canned pleading prepared by a paralegal from New Trak screens. The Debtors were charged $800 for the cost of the motion.” Opinion, p. 14. The motion also recited that the debtors had no equity in the property which the attorney later attributed to being part of a boilerplate form. The response to the objection to claim said that the claim was just fine when it was not.

The Debtor’s attorney did not do much better. She filed a late response, which incorrectly stated that the debtors had made all of their payments but they had been returned by HSBC. The Debtor’s attorney also failed to respond to requests for admission tendered with the motion, incorrectly believing that her response to the motion was sufficient.

Upon receiving the Debtor’s attorney’s response, HSBC’s local counsel continued the hearing for further investigation. The Debtor’s lawyer then filed an amended response, which included copies of the checks for the months of September through January with both front and back and the checks for February and March with just the front. The amended response alleged that the payments for September through March had all been made. As it turns out, the reason that there were only copies of the front side of the February and March payments was because the Debtor’s counsel was still in possession of these checks which had not yet been tendered. Debtor’s counsel erroneously mailed these checks to the person at HSBC’s attorney’s office who handled Sheriff’s Sales rather than to the Bankruptcy Department. The person in the Sheriff’s Sale department sat on the checks and did not inform the Bankruptcy Department that they had been received. The Debtor’s counsel also requested a payment history.

On May 1, a young associate appeared for HSBC and insisted on prosecuting the motion even though he had been provided with proof of payments. The young attorney sought to proceed based on the deemed admissions even though he knew they were not accurate. The court denied the motion and instructed the debtor to escrow the disputed flood insurance premiums while the parties worked through the issue.

One month later, the parties appeared on the claims objection and things rapidly escalated. The young associate (he had been licensed a few months at the time) stated that he could not get a payment history from his client. He explained that he had submitted a request for a payment history through an electronic system, but that he was forbidden to speak directly with the client. This statement caused the Court to issue a show cause order.

In response to the Court’s Show Cause Order, HSBC retained new counsel and the problem with the claim was quickly settled. As noted by the Court, “What could not be accomplished for six months through the use of electronic communication was finalized in an hour the old way, by people sitting down with all relevant information and talking to each other.” Opinion, p. 19.

While the contested matters were quickly settled, the Court was not satisfied. It launched an inquiry which brought the technology center stage.

The Technology and Professional Responsibility

The technology involved was the NewTrak system developed and operated by Lender Processing Services, Inc. f/k/a Fidelity Information Services, Inc. To its credit, LPS was “extremely cooperative” with the court’s inquiry and “provided a detailed demonstration of how NewTrak works in a hypothetical case.” Opinion, p. 9, n. 15. As a result, the Court had a substantial knowledge base to draw on when writing her opinion. NewTrak is an automation system which allows lenders and attorneys to communicate with each other. The lender uploads its information onto the system which then generates a referral to an attorney on the approved list. The attorney receives the information and generates the proof of claim, motion for relief from automatic stay or other pleading. The system also allows the attorney to request information from the client by opening an issue on the system. Another system called the mortgage servicing platform handles routine mortgage servicing. According to LPS, it was used by 39 of the 50 largest banks in 2007 and processed approximately 50% of the loans in the United States.

While NewTrak provides a flow of information between attorney and client, it is not meant to prohibit direct contact between the parties. The Default Services Agreement specifically provides that “The Firm will never be prohibited from directly contacting any client where, in the professional opinion of the Firm such contact is necessary.” Opinion, p. 34, n. 45. As a result, the agreement contemplates that the Firm will exercise professional judgment. However, the Court found that when an attorney mechanically uses the system “the attorney abandons any pretense of independent judgment to the greater goal of expeditious and economical client service.” Opinion, p. 31.

The Court contrasted the benefits of using the technology with its pitfalls when a matter is not routine.

It is a regrettable reality, especially in this economic climate, that many homeowners are defaulting on their mortgages. While bankruptcy affords an opportunity to save the family home through a Chapter 13 plan that stretches the payments of mortgage arrears, it also requires debtors to maintain current payment on their mortgages. (citation omitted). This obligation is beyond the capability of many debtors who use a bankruptcy to forestall the inevitable. It seems reasonable that a mortgage lender should be able to avail itself of economic and expeditious means of collecting defaulted loans through the use of technology and delegation of tasks to lower cost labor. In many cases, the motions are granted by default, the debtors, or often more accurately their attorneys, filing no answer or making no appearance, where there is simply no defense to the relief sought. However, where, as here, the debtor contests the relief sought, the flaws in the automated process become apparent. At this juncture, an attorney must cease processing files and act like a lawyer. That means she must become personally engaged, conferring with the client directly and abandoning her reliance on computer screens as an expression of her client’s will. This did not happen in this case until the Court became involved. It should not have taken judicial intervention to bring the Claim Objection to its conclusion.
Opinion, p. 32 (emphasis added).

In this case, the court found that professional judgment was not used.
The attorney for the national firm which filed the proof of claim testified that he reviewed only a representative sample of 10% of the claims which were electronically signed with his name. He did not review the specific claim in this case and as a result, did not find the mistakes in it.

The president of the local firm which utilized NewTrak testified that he delegated the administrative aspects of the firm’s practice and was unaware of how NewTrak worked.

The head of the bankruptcy section of the firm electronically signed all of the pleadings in the matter, but delegated all of the court appearances to an attorney who had been licensed for only one month when the initial pleading was filed. The court found that the head of the bankruptcy section failed to supervise the young attorney and asked the rhetorical question, “Could it be with ten lawyers and 130 paralegals and processors, a young attorney is expected to figure it out himself?” Opinion, p. 42.

The Court also found that the client had restricted the firm’s authority.

The Udren Firm’s authority from HSBC allowed them to take only three actions: (1) seek a continuance; (2) settle with Motion with an agreement for a six month maximum cure of the mortgage arrears with an agreement for stay relief upon certification of default of any future payment; and failing either of the foregoing; (3) press the motion. (citation omitted). No consultation with HSBC was expected nor occurred during the pendency of the contested matter.
Opinion, p. 37, n. 49.

Sanctions

The Court found that several parties to the case had violated their obligations under Rule 9011, including the obligation to make reasonable inquiry. However, the Court was also mindful that sanctions should be “limited to what is sufficient to deter a repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.” Rule 9011(c)(2). As a result, the Court granted some very creative relief.

As to the Udren Firm, which acted as local counsel, the Court found that the expense of having to hire counsel and defend itself and the productive time lost in attending to the matter was punishment enough. However, the Court devoted additional attention to the specific lawyers from the firm.

The Court found that the head of the Udren Firm’s bankruptcy section “may be so enmeshed in the assembly line of managing the bankruptcy department’s volume mortgage practice that she has lost sight of her duty to the court and has compromised her ethical obligations.” Opinion, p. 52. The Court ordered her to obtain 3 credits of CLE in professional responsibility/ethics in addition to her regular requirements.

The court declined to award sanctions against the young associate, finding that “I believe these proceedings have been very hard on this young lawyer and while lack of experience is not a defense to a Rule 9011 violation, I suspect that he has learned all that he needs to learn without protracting this unfortunate time in his nascent career.” Opinion, p. 52.

The Court found that the head of the firm “sets the tone and establishes its culture. He notes his firm’s reliance on NewTrak and other such aids as essential to the economic structure of the law practice. However, he had little familiarity with the actual operation of NewTrak and did not appear to get involved in the ‘weeds’ of the bankruptcy practice.” Opinion, pp. 52-53. The Court found this lack of involvement to be troubling and ordered relief accordingly.

Mr. Udren may not be aware of the questionable practices imposed by his firm’s acquiescence to NewTrak and how little legal judgment is employed as a result or he may be aware and find it acceptable. To examine these practices in light of extant ethical obligations, I will direct him to obtain training in NewTrak and spend a day observing his bankruptcy attorneys, paralegals, managers and processors as they handle referrals. Since policy emanates from the top, I will also order Udren and (the head of the bankruptcy section) to conduct a training session for all members of the bankruptcy department in the appropriate use of the escalation procedure and the requirements of Rule 9011 with respect to pre-filing due diligence.
Opinion, p. 53.

The Court did not award sanctions against the national firm which prepared the proof of claim, but not because she found their conduct appropriate. The Court found that the record had not been fully developed with regard to this party, that the practices were national in scope and that the U.S. Trustee was investigating the firm. As a result, the Court left it to another day and another court to address these issues.

The Court found that some of the problems in the case resulted from the Udren firm's reluctance to contact its client directly and found that other firms used by HSBC might be under the same impression. As a result, the Court ordered HSBC “to prepare and transmit by mail and e-mail a letter to all the Network Firms outlining the escalation policy and encourage its use consistent with the Rules of Professional Conduct. HSBC should also advise the Network Firms that use of direct contact will not reflect adversely on the firm.” Opinion, p. 55.

The Court did not sanction LPS.

Based on the record, I find that sactions against LPS are not warranted. While it does appear from the limited screens that have been introduced in this case, that LPS’ involvement goes beyond passing data through their automatic system, I cannot conclude that it imposed restrictions on the Udren Firm’s handling of this case. (citation omitted). The Udren Firm entered into a contract with Fidelity which it viewed as advantageous to the business relationships with its mortgage lender clients and presumably its bottom line. As attorneys, the Udren Firm understood an attorney’s obligations under Rule 9011 to investigate and took a lesser approach. While NewTrak prescribed that approach, LPS did not dictate how they would handle cases referred to them when problems with the procedure were apparent. By misusing the resources made available to them, the Udren Firm, not LPS, was responsible for the Rule 9011 deficiencies in this case.
Opinion, pp. 55-56.

Conclusion

Judge Sigmund’s remarkable opinion demonstrates that she is no Luddite. Her opinion focuses on the need to exercise professional judgment in conjunction with technology rather than mindlessly bashing the technology itself. In her conclusion, she stated:

My research has disclosed no other published opinion that explains the NewTrak process that is utilized by so many consumer mortgage lenders seeking relief in bankruptcy cases. I have attempted to share my education in this Opinion. Finally, it is my hope that by bringing the NewTrak process to the light of day in a published opinion, system changes will be made by the attorneys and lenders who employ the system or at least help courts formulate the right questions when they have not. While NewTrak has many features that make a volume business process more efficient, the users may not abandon their responsibility for fairness and accuracy to the seduction of electronic communication. The escalation procedures in place at HSBC and the Udren Firm existed on paper only. When an attorney appears in a matter, it is assumed he or she brings not only substantive knowledge of the law but judgment. The competition for business cannot be an impediment to the use of these capabilities. The attorney, as opposed to a processor, knows when a contest does not fit the cookie cutter forms employed by paralegals. At that juncture, the use of technology and automated queries must yield to hand-carried justice. The client must be advised, questioned and consulted. Young lawyers must be trained to make those judgments as opposed to merely following the form manual. Until they are capable of doing so they should be supported and not left to sink or swim alone in an effort for the firm to be more profitable by leveraging the cheapest labor.

At issue in these cases are the homes of poor and unfortunate debtors, more and more of whom are threatened with foreclosure due to the historic job loss and housing crisis in this country. Congress, in its wisdom, has fashioned a bankruptcy law which balances the rights and duties of debtors and creditors. Chapter 13 is a rehabilitative process with a goal of saving the family home. The thoughtless mechanical employment of computer-driven models and communications to inexpensively traverse the path to foreclosure offends the integrity of our American bankruptcy system. It is for those involved in the process to step back and assess how they can fulfill their professional obligations and responsibly reap the benefits of technology. Nothing less should be tolerated.
Opinion, pp. 57-58 (emphasis added).

Friday, April 24, 2009

On Gunslingers, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof

There have been an increasing number of cases dealing with objections to assigned credit card debt. These cases are a bit like a showdown between gunfighters with bad aim: there is a lot of shooting, but no one hits anything. While a gunfight where no one gets shot is a good thing, the court must still decide whether to allow or disallow the claim even when there is little or no evidence introduced. As a result, rules on presumptions and burden of proof often dictate the result.

Prima Facie Valid Or Not

The starting point is Fed.R.Bankr.P. 3001(f) states that “A proof of claim executed and filed in accordance with these rules shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of the claim.” Thus, if the creditor files its claim in accordance with the rules, it starts out with a presumption of validity. However, before the claim receives prima facie validity, it must be filed in accordance with the rules, particularly Rule 3001. Among other things, Rule 3001(c) provides that if a claim is based upon a writing, that writing must be attached or a statement must be provided explaining why the writing cannot be attached. Several courts have held that merely attaching a summary which lists the name of the original creditor, the last four digits of the account number and the balance claimed to be owed does not meet the requirement that the writing be attached to the claim, thus depriving the claim of prima facie validity. In re Tran, 369 B.R. 312 (S.D. Tex. 2007); In re Cox, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4048 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007).

Courts have required different levels of documentation to satisfy the prima facie validity requirement. At the low end are courts requiring as little as a copy of an account statement from the original creditor, In re Griffin, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1749 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007), while some courts require copies of the underlying contract, account statements and/or proof of assignment of the debt. In re Armstrong, 320 B.R. 97 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.2005)(account statement plus proof of assignment), In re Tran, 369 B.R. 312 (S.D. Tex. 2006)(requiring original contract), In re Leverett, 378 B.R. 793 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2007)(requiring documentary evidence of how claimant acquired the claim and proof that it is the holder of the claim); In re Plourde, 397 B.R. 207 (D.N.H. 2008)(requiring original contract plus statements plus proof of assignment); In re Kendall, 380 B.R. 37 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2007)(requiring contract plus itemization plus proof of assignment).

Effect of Prima Facie Validity

A recent opinion explained how failure to satisfy the requirements for prima facie validity affected the burden of proof on a claims objection.

Having little to none of the requirement information attached for a credit card debt, Roundup’s claim did not comply with Rule 3001(c). The Court, therefore, concludes that Roundup Funding’s claim is not entitled to prima facie validity under Bankruptcy Rule 3001(f). Without such validity, Debtors needed only to object to the claim pursuant to the applicable rules or statute, which they did. Debtors had listed this debt as ‘disputed’ so they did not judicially admit that they owe it. Although the Debtors did not attach any evidence to their objection to Claim Number 12, such as an affidavit, the objection was sufficient by being signed by their counsel under penalty of Rule 9011. (citation omitted).

After the Debtor’s valid objection, Roundup Funding had the burden of offering supporting documentation to carry its burden of proof in the face of an objection. It had to establish the claim by a preponderance of the evidence. (citation omitted). Roundup Funding presented no evidence to support its claim. Its information was submitted in the form of a response with attached exhibits, all in the nature of argument, and not by affidavit or by witness testimony. It provided no evidence to link the entity assigning the claim with an entity listed on the Debtor’s schedules. In any event, this attachment page to the claim is not a business record of the Debtor’s credit card account within the meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6).

In re Reyna, No. 08-10049 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 7/28/08), Memorandum Opinion and Order, pp. 8-9; In re Plourde, 397 B.R. 207 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2008)(if claim is not prima facie valid, valid objection is all that is necessary to put creditor to its proof).

If the claim is entitled to prima facie validity, the Debtor must introduce sufficient evidence to rebut the prima facie case. In order to rebut the prima facie validity of a claim, the objecting party must produce “evidence tending to defeat the claim that is of a probative force equal to that of the creditor’s proof of claim.” In re Simmons, 765 F.2d 547, 552 (5th Cir. 1985). Sometimes the claim itself may be sufficient to rebut its own prima facie validity. In the case of In re Bootka, No. 08-11506 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2/23/09), the attachment to the proof of claim stated that the debt had been charged off more than four years before the petition date. As a result, the debt appeared to be barred by the four year statute of limitations applicable in Texas. The creditor filed an affidavit from the prior owner of the claim stating that a payment had posted to the account on January 18, 2008. This was significant because a payment could revive the statute of limitations under Texas law. However, the Court found that the creditor failed to meet its burden of proof because it did not state who made the payment or when it was actually made (as opposed to when it was posted). As a result, the prima facie case was rebutted and the creditor failed to prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Judicial Estoppel/Party Admission

Sometimes, the creditor can prove its case simply because the debtor has already admitted the validity of the claim. If the debtor has scheduled a claim which can be identified to the proof of claim in approximately the same amount and has identified the claim as undisputed, then the debtor will be estopped to deny the validity of the claim or will be deemed to have made a party admission. Of course, if the debtor has scheduled the claim as disputed or if there is a significant variation between the claim and the schedules, then judicial estoppel will not apply. The case of In re Cox, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4048 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007) illustrates how far the judicial admission doctrine may extend. In that case, the debtor scheduled three claims owing to Chase Bank. As an illustration, one claim was scheduled in the amount of $20,312.83 with the last four digits 0445. B-Real, LLC filed a claim in the amount of $21,534.50 in the name of B-Real, LLC/Chase Bank USA, N.A. on a claim with the last four digits 0445. The claim (as amended) was supported by account statements from Chase Bank showing the amount owed. Although the identity of the creditor was different, the court still found that the debtor had made a party-admission that the debt was owed. See also In re Kendall, 380 B.R. 37 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2007)(if debtor has listed claim as not disputed in its schedules, this is some evidence of validity). On the other hand, where the identity of the creditor was different, the schedules and the claim included different portions of the sixteen digit account number and the claim amounts were different, the court refused to apply judicial estoppel. In re Reyna, No. 08-10049 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 7/28/08).

Judicial estoppel will only apply as to the debtor. Several courts have refused to apply judicial estoppel to the chapter 13 trustee. In re Plourde, 397 B.R. 207 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2008); In re Bootka, No. 08-11506 (Bankr.W.D. Tex. 2/23/09). The opinion from the Western District of Texas is based on Fifth Circuit precedent requiring that parties be identical for judicial estoppel to apply. Kane v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 535 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2008). This result seems to follow the logic of judicial estoppel the closest, since only the party making the admission should be estopped. An opinion by the 10th Circuit BAP held that the trustee would not be bound by the debtor’s admission in the schedules, but that the schedules provided some evidence in favor of allowing the claim. In re Kirkland, 379 B.R. 341, 344, n. 12 (10th Cir. BAP 2007).

Proof of Assignment

Courts have disagreed on the extent to which proof of assignment must be established. The most creditor-friendly courts note that Rule 3001 only requires proof of assignment where the original creditor has previously filed a proof of claim. In re Gonzales, 356 B.R. 905 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006); In re Griffin, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1748 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007). Where only one creditor files a claim with respect to a debt scheduled by the debtor, the creditor will not be required to show how the debt was assigned to it. These cases take the position that if the debtor owes the debt and only one party is claiming to own it, that the debtor should not escape payment based on failure of the specific creditor to establish how it came to own the account. On the other hand, some courts have required proof of assignment and have gone further and required that the assignment reflect the specific debt rather than merely a blanket assignment. In re Armstrong, 320 B.R. 97 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.2005); In re Leverett, 378 B.R. 793 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2007); In re Kendall, 380 B.R. 37 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2007). Finally, some courts require proof of assignment, but will accept a blanket assignment. In re Samson, 392 B.R. 724 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008).

Other Objections

Assuming that the claim is supported by prima facie evidence, the debtor’s objection to the claim must fall within one of the grounds identified by 11 U.S.C. §502(b), including that a claim is not enforceable under applicable law. In re Kirkland, 379 B.R. 341 (10th Cir. BAP 2007). Thus, a debtor could not object to a claim on the basis that the creditor had failed to redact the debtor’s social security number as required by Bankr. Rule 9037. Cordier vs. Plains Commerce Bank, No. 08-2037 (Bankr. D.Ct. 3/26/09). While the creditor violated a procedural rule, this was not a statutory ground for denying the claim.

Failure to file a timely claim is a stated ground for objection under 11 U.S.C. §502(b)(9). However, what happens if the claims bar date runs while the case has been dismissed, but is later reinstated? A thoughtful opinion holds that due process requires that the court be allowed to set a new bar date in this instance. In re Gulley, No. 07-33271 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 3/3/2009).

Conclusion

Courts are struggling with objections to assigned credit card debt. Courts generally agree that a mere account summary prepared by the assignee will not satisfy the requirement to attach the documents on which the claim is based. However, courts differ as to whether the underlying contract or the account statement must be produced. A series of account statements will show that the debtor used the card and establish the pattern of dealings between the parties. This may be enough to prove the existence of a contract. Creditors should look to the proof required by a state court. If a sworn account or account statements would be adequate in state court, it should be sufficient in bankruptcy court. The underlying contract should not be necessary to satisfy the prima facie validity requirement (although many courts have required it). However, if the debtor objects to items such as calculation of interest or fees, the creditor may be required to provide the agreement in order to satisfy its ultimate burden of proof.

Courts also differ on whether proof of an assignment should be provided. On the one hand, proof of assignment is an element in establishing that the creditor is the holder of the claim. However, where the debtor has admitted owing the underlying account and no other party has filed a claim, it may be reasonable to conclude that a valid assignment occurred. Some courts have noted that Fed.R.Bankr.P. 3001(e) only requires proof of assignment of a claim if another creditor has already filed a claim. This may be misleading. Rule 3001(e) is designed to settle disputes between an original creditor and a party claiming to be an assignee. Where the claim is assigned prior to bankruptcy or prior to a claim being filed by the original creditor, there is no need to resolve this dispute. Instead, the issue concerns the more fundamental question of whether the creditor holds the claim.

The process for determining allowance of an assigned credit card debt can be summarized as a decision tree.

1. Does the claim include sufficient documentation to receive prima facie validity?
If yes, debtor must rebut prima facie case before creditor must put on case.
If no, debtor need only raise a valid objection to require creditor to carry burden of proof.

2. If claim is prima facie valid, has debtor rebutted the prima facie case?
If yes, creditor must prove claim by preponderance of the evidence.
If no, claim is allowed.

3. Has debtor judicially admitted validity of claim?
If yes, claim is allowed (unless a party other than the debtor is objecting).
If no, creditor must prove claim by preponderance of the evidence.

4. Has creditor established valid assignment of claim?
If yes, claim is allowed assuming creditor has met other requirements.
If no, claim is denied unless debtor is judicially estopped from denying claim or in jurisdictions which do not require proof of assignment.

5. If neither party has prevailed at this point, who produced more credible evidence?
If creditor, then claim is allowed.
If debtor, then claim is denied.

This article originally appeared in the ABI Consumer Bankruptcy Committee Newsletter, Vol. 7, No. 2 (April 2009).

Thursday, April 16, 2009

Sign Costs Creditor $21,800

Chuck Newton's blog, stayviolation.com, has the details on a case he recently tried in which a creditor posted a sign in a small town stating: "BRAD COLLIER OWES ME $984.23 WILL YOU PLEASE COME AND PAY ME!" The Court awarded $21,820.00 in damages for violation of the automatic stay. No. 08-2004, James Bradley Collier v. Paul Hill (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 4/7/09). Go to Posting Signs About the Debtor Can Constitute A Stay Violation on Chuck's Blog for all the details.

Wednesday, April 08, 2009

10th Circuit Affirms Denial of Employment of Attorneys Who Were Too Expensive

In these days of exponentially increasing hourly rates, a bankruptcy court told a creditors' committee that its proposed counsel was too expensive when there were local firms competent to do the work for half the cost. That decision was recently affirmed by the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. In re Southwest Food Distributors, No. 08-5160 (10th Cir. 3/31/09).

The Debtor filed a chapter 11 petition in Tulsa, Oklahoma. The Unsecured Creditors Committee sought to employ Bell, Boyd & Lloyd, a Chicago firm, and to also employ Gable & Gotwals of Tulsa as its local counsel. Bell Boyd sought to charge rates ranging from $250 to $505 per hour. A large unsecured creditor objected on the basis that there was no need to bring in a national firm when there were local firms available at half the cost. The Bankruptcy Court agreed and approved employment of the local counsel only.

On appeal to the 10th Circuit, the Court of Appeals ruled that the Bankruptcy Court is not required to rubberstamp a party's choice of counsel even when that counsel meets the requirements of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 1103 and Fed.R.Bankr.P. 2014. The court noted that close scrutiny is required when more than one attorney is sought to be employed.

Several thoughts come to mind after reading this opinion. Many, if not most, courts require that out of district firms retain local counsel. If retaining both primary counsel and local counsel is looked upon with disfavor, this is almost a de facto rule that outside attorneys need not apply. Was the bankruptcy court engaging in protectionism here or was this simply a case which could not afford the extra attorneys? The bankruptcy court's decision to promote the committee's local counsel to lead counsel raises an interesting issue. If local counsel was chosen purely to satisfy the requirement to have a local attorney and not because they had the expertise to represent the committee, should the committee be saddled with counsel who was not their first choice? Of course, in this case, the court found that local counsel was perfectly competent and that no one had objected to their qualifications. Perhaps the committee should have selected less qualified local counsel in order to obtain their choice of lead counsel. Finally, the objection stated that qualified local attorneys could be hired at half the cost of Bell Boyd's rates of $250-$505. Does this mean that the going rate for creditors' counsel in Tulsa is $125.00-$252.50 per hour? If that is the case, the Tulsa bankruptcy bar may find itself in demand elsewhere where the going rates are much higher.

Tuesday, April 07, 2009

Leif Clark on Reaffirmations: Six Short Clark Opinions on Reaffirmation and What They Mean

Leif Clark is one of the most prolific judges on the bankruptcy bench today. His opinions are generally both scholarly and entertaining to read. However, one adjective which is not usually applied to his opinions is short. Therefore, it is worthy of note that in the past year, Judge Clark his written no fewer than six opinions denying approval of reaffirmation agreements and giving guidance to the parties with regard to the unreaffirmed debt, none of which is longer than three pages.

One line of cases involves Texas home equity loans. In re Brown, No. 08-53373-C (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 4/3/09); In re Porras, No. 07-31488-C (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 3/27/08). As noted by Judge Clark, reaffirmation of a home equity loan is a contradiction in terms, since the Texas Constitution requires home equity loans to be made on a nonrecourse basis.

The subject of the agreement is a home equity loan. Such loans are non-recourse loans, as a matter of Texas law. There is thus no personal liability on the part of the debtor to USAA Federal Savings Bank. USAA's remedies prior to this bankruptcy being filed were limited to recourse to the property in the event of nonpayment and failure to cure. The bankruptcy changed nothing with regard to the nature of this liability. The debtor's discharge has no impact at all on USAA's claim because discharge only affects the debtor's personal liability on a debt, and the debtor never had any personal liability on this debt, even outside bankruptcy. With nothing to discharge, there should be nothing to reaffirm either.

Yet USAA now wants a reaffirmation agreement from the debtor anyway. Why? To what end? Surely not because USAA fears that without such an agreement, its efforts to enforce this debt might contravene the discharge injunction. That is a red herring, if ever there was one. Enforcement of a nonrecourse debt never violates the discharge, as a matter of law.

In re Brown.

Several additional cases concern the situation where the debtors request approval of a reaffirmation but the court denies it for reasons including undue hardship, reconsideration by the debtors and untimeliness. In re Gamboa, No. 08-52028-C (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1/7/09); In re Davidson, No. 08-51818-C (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 11/21/08); In re Self, No. 08-52687-C (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 11/21/08); In re Morales, No. 07-31453-C (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 3/27/08). In these cases, the Court denied the reaffirmation, but explained where this decision left the parties.

Notwithstanding such denial, the court finds and concludes that the creditor holds a valid and enforceable in rem claim. The creditor is accordingly expressly authorized and permitted to enforce the obligation of the debtors to the creditor as an in rem obligation, such enforcement to include the right to notify the debtor of payments that are or are to become due, the right to demand payment when such payments are not made (either in full or in part), the right to threaten resort to in rem remedies in the event of non-payment, the right to accelerate the indebtedness, the right to give notice of foreclosure sale, and the right to conduct and complete such foreclosure sale, so long as all of the foregoing are conducted in accordance with applicable non-bankruptcy law. None of the foregoing shall ever constitute a violation of the discharge injunction entered in this case pursuant to section 524(a) of title 11.

Further the creditor is authorized and permitted to communicate with the debtor regarding the status of the account, either orally or in writing, and the debtors are authorized and permitted to obtain information from the creditor, either orally or in writing, regarding the status of the account. The creditor is authorized and permitted to afford the debtors the same services with respect to this account as they would enjoy had there been no bankruptcy, including as applicable internet access to the account, the use of electronic funds transfers as a means of payment, the right to receive regular billing statements, and regular escrow updates. The provision of all such services shall never constitute a violation of the discharge injunction entered in this case pursuant to section 524(a) of title 11.

Further, the creditor is authorized and permitted to renegotiate the terms of the indebtedness with the debtors (provided that such renegotiated indebtedness shall remain as an in rem liability of the debtors), to provide payoff amounts for the purposes of any refinancing with a third party, or for purposes of a sale of the underlying property. The provision of any of the foregoing shall never constitute a violation of the discharge injunction entered in this case pursuant to section 524(a) of title 11.

In re Gamboa.

What is happening here? While these brief opinions may never find their way into the published case reports, they show the court taking an active interest in the welfare of the debtors appearing before it. Not all reaffirmation agreements should be approved. The Code prohibits the Bankruptcy Court from approving an agreement where it would constitute an undue hardship or it is not timely submitted. However, rather than simply denying the agreements and leaving the parties to figure out the consequences, Judge Clark has spelled out what it means to have an ongoing in rem obligation. While his missives may constitute advisory opinions, they are useful in that they may reassure lenders that it is okay to continue to communicate with their borrowers. More importantly, they undermine a lender's ability to retaliate against a debtor who has not reaffirmed a debt by freezing them out post-discharge.

This issue recently came up in one of my cases. A debtor had received his discharge some five years earlier. The lender changed servicers around the time of the discharge and no reaffirmation agreement was ever tendered to the debtors. The debtors continued to make their payments and ultimately refinanced the debt. When they sought to purchase a new property, the underwriters for the prospective lender could not understand how a debtor had continued to make payments on a discharged debt. As a result, they did not want to credit that payment history. I was able to provide an explanation of how bankruptcy works with a copy of the Gamboa opinion to show that I was not just making it up. Hopefully, the underwriters will read and comprehend the opinion.